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WHEN SHADOW REMOVALS COLLIDE:  
SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE LEGAL 
BLACK HOLES CREATED BY  
EXPEDITED REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT 
JENNIFER LEE KOH* 
ABSTRACT 
Immigration scholarship has begun to explore the prominence of shadow 
removals—deportations that are executed by front-line agency officials 
acting outside the presence of an immigration judge—which now constitute 
the majority of all reported removals. This Article explores two of the most 
common forms of shadow removals, expedited removal and reinstatement 
of removal, and the collision of the two. Expedited removal has typically 
been perceived as a border enforcement tool, used against persons with 
limited ties to the United States. Reinstatement of removal exists for persons 
who enter the U.S. without authorization following a prior removal. The 
rising use of each streamlined procedure is, on its own, troubling from a 
fairness, accuracy, and rule of law perspective. But like chemical 
compounds mixing and creating new substances, expedited removal and 
reinstatement interact to produce unique situations in which the law renders 
people forever subject to immediate deportation based primarily on the 
existence of a brief encounter at some point in the past with a border official. 
These situations are akin to legal black holes in immigration law, and have 
not been examined in any of the scholarly literature to date. 
This Article is the first to consider the interplay of expedited removal and 
reinstatement. It traces the operation of the two removal processes, both 
independently and in combination with each other. It emphasizes the harsh 
statutory bars on judicial and habeas review, and the resulting inability of 
the federal judiciary to ameliorate the harshness of removal in this context. 
The Article then suggests that the use of reinstatement based on prior 
expedited removal orders fails the basic administrative law requirement 
                                                           
* Professor of Law and Director of Immigration Clinic, Western State College of Law. J.D., Columbia 
Law School; B.A., Yale University. Versions of this Article were presented at the Immigration Law 
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that federal agencies demonstrate reasoned decision-making and avoid 
arbitrary or capricious action. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Judulang v. Holder, which applied arbitrary and capricious review in the 
deportation context, the Article encourages courts to more closely scrutinize 
the use of reinstatement based on expedited removal.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Israel Barrios was minutes from home and on his way to work in the city 
of Santa Ana, California when immigration officials arrested him in early 
October 2017.1 Barrios had first come to the United States in the late 1990s 
                                                           
1. See Gabriel San Ramon, Children of Man Detained by Border Patrol in Santa Ana Weep for 
his Return, OC WEEKLY (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.ocweekly.com/activists-call-on-ice-to-release-
santa-ana-family-man-8475231/ [https://perma.cc/2K2V-CX9N]; Santa Ana Father of 6 Detained by 
ICE, CBS LOS ANGELES (Oct. 5, 2017, 11:13 AM), http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2017/10/05/santa-
ana-father-of-6-ice/ [https://perma.cc/XU9M-7TUL]; Donald Trump is Deporting Fewer People Than 
Barack Obama Did, THE ECONOMIST, (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2017/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
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after crossing the border without immigration papers.2 He settled in the state 
of Georgia, had six U.S. citizen children, and worked to provide for his 
family. Around 2010, he pled guilty to misdemeanor driving without a 
license, the only offense on his record. Sensing the political tides turning 
against undocumented immigrants, Barrios returned to his home country of 
Mexico after more than a decade of living in the United States. But while in 
Mexico, gang violence and other dangers compelled him to return to the 
United States around 2012.3  
The fact that Barrios returned to Mexico, only to return a second time to 
the United States, is not remarkable. But when he attempted to cross the 
U.S.-Mexico border, he was apprehended by Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) officers who left Barrios with the impression that he was 
being ordered to return voluntarily to Mexico.4 He did not have an 
opportunity to explain that he feared persecution in Mexico, as required by 
law.5 In reality, as Barrios learned years later, he had received an expedited 
removal order. Barrios ultimately reunited with the rest of his family in the 
United States after this encounter with border officials, and settled in Santa 
Ana, California. After his arrest in October 2017, Barrios learned that due 
to the expedited removal order in 2012, federal immigration authorities 
could—but were not required to—designate Barrios for a truncated 
deportation procedure known as reinstatement of removal.6 A front-line 
immigration officer chose to place him in reinstatement. In reinstatement, 
Barrios’s only hope of avoiding immediate deportation was to establish that 
he had a reasonable fear of returning to Mexico.7 He could not ask an 
immigration judge (IJ) or federal court to review the legitimacy of the 
expedited removal order, and he could not seek other claims to relief 
available under the immigration laws.8 Indeed, had he not received pro bono 
legal representation, media attention, and strong community support, it is 
quite likely that Barrios would have been deported within days of his arrest 
without ever seeing an IJ.  
                                                           
12/14/donald-trump-is-deporting-fewer-people-than-barack-obama-did [https://perma.cc/X2DE-M24 
U] (describing Israel Barrios’ immigration arrest).  
2. Email from Monika Langarica, Israel Barrios’s attorney, to author (February 12, 2018) (on 
file with author) [hereinafter Langarica email].  
3. Id.  
4. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary departure and voluntary 
return). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 90–94 (discussing credible fear provisions in expedited 
removal).  
6. See Langarica email, supra note 2.  
7. See infra Part I.C (explaining reinstatement). 
8. Id.  
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Israel Barrios’s case illustrates several trends in immigration 
enforcement under the Trump Administration.9 But this Article is focused 
on the process—or lack of process, rather— received by Barrios and scores 
of others situated at the crossroads of expedited removal and reinstatement 
of removal. Cases like Barrios’s are not a product or phenomenon of the 
current Administration alone, but could become far more common if left 
unchecked by the courts.  
A nascent literature emphasizes how deportation has increasingly moved 
outside the control of the immigration courts and into what I have called 
elsewhere the “shadows” of immigration court.10 Such removals have 
altered the landscape of immigration adjudication and enforcement over the 
past two decades. The conventional wisdom about immigration adjudication 
states that removal decisions are adjudicated by IJs presiding over 
immigration courts.11 But the conventional wisdom no longer applies, with 
immigration judge-issued removal orders becoming the exception rather 
than the norm. Through a variety of mechanisms, including an 
                                                           
9. For instance, other than a misdemeanor conviction for driving without a license, Barrios had 
no criminal record. This is consistent with reports that immigration authorities have indiscriminately 
targeted all undocumented immigrants irrespective of their prior criminal histories. See Maria Sacchetti, 
ICE Immigration Arrests of Noncriminals Double Under Trump, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/U543-RMMW (reporting on doubling of immigration arrests of persons with no 
criminal records from January to March 2017); THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1 (describing arbitrary 
nature of ICE arrests). Barrios’s arrest in the city of Santa Ana, which had enacted just months before 
what has been described as one of the strongest sanctuary policies in the country, highlights the inherent 
limitations of local sanctuary laws in a world of growing federal resources devoted to immigration 
enforcement. See Jessica Kwong, Santa Ana’s Status as Sanctuary City Made Official, O.C. REGISTER 
(Jan. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/Z5B5-6D47; Lawrence Downes, A “Sanctuary City” Seizes the 
Moment, and the Name, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/KPH4-6B5F (describing the Santa 
Ana, California sanctuary ordinance as “one of the boldest and most far-reaching sanctuary ordinances 
in the state”). See also Press Release, Immigration & Customs Enf’t, Statement from ICE Acting 
Director Thomas Holman on California Sanctuary Law (Oct. 6, 2017) (stating that in response to State 
of California’s enactment of SB 54, limiting nonfederal law enforcement collaboration with immigration 
authorities, “ICE will have no choice but to conduct at-large arrests in local neighborhoods and at 
worksites, which will inevitably result in additional collateral arrests, instead of focusing on arrests at 
jails and prisons where transfers are safer for ICE officers and the community”),   
https://perma.cc/GT3Y-6TKU. Barrios’s subsequent release from ICE detention also illustrates the 
potential power of community organizing and moral outrage in efforts to resist the government’s 
immigration enforcement trends. Langarica email, supra note 2; Jennifer Lee Koh, Anticipating 
Expansion, Committing to Resistance: Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court Under Trump, 43 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 459, 469 (2017) (discussing role of community organizing in deportation defense 
strategies). 
10. Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 
(2017). See also Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 
5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1 (2014); Jill E. Family, A Broader View of the Immigration Adjudication 
Problem, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 595 (2009); ACLU, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID DEPORTATIONS THAT 
BYPASS THE COURTROOM (2014); DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE 
NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA 52, 65–67 (2012); Mary Holper, The Unreasonable Seizures of Shadow 
Deportations, U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=3040929 [https://perma.cc/Q85Z-YQKY]. 
11. See Koh, supra note 10, at 188–92. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
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administrative removal process for non-lawful permanent residents with 
aggravated felony convictions12 and the availability of processes in which 
noncitizens stipulate to their own removal,13 the vast majority of removals 
now take place with little to no participation by immigration courts and IJs.14 
Expedited removal and reinstatement account for the lion’s share of the 
panoply of shadow removals, and constituted about eighty-five percent of 
all removals in fiscal years 2015 and 2016.15 Most of the literature thus far 
has focused on recognizing the rise of summary removals, identifying their 
harms, tracing the judiciary’s deference to their use, and comparing them to 
immigration court adjudication.16 Indeed, each form of summary removal is 
governed by a unique statutory and regulatory framework, and raises 
problems related to fairness, accuracy, and the rule of law.17 But no 
scholarly work to date has focused on the combination of two shadow 
removals (here, expedited removal and reinstatement of removal), how they 
amplify each other’s deficiencies, and how they together create situations in 
which government power over noncitizens reaches unprecedented and 
under-theorized levels. This Article seeks to fill that gap.  
A deeper understanding of removals that bypass the courtroom has 
become increasingly urgent in the current political climate. President Trump 
has displayed great interest in minimizing the role of the immigration courts, 
as shown in a June 24, 2018 tweet declaring that, “When somebody comes 
in, we must immediately, with no Judges or Court Cases, bring them back 
from where they came.”18 But long before that tweet, the Trump 
Administration signaled that its reliance on summary removals—
specifically expedited removal—could proliferate. Within days of taking 
office, the Trump Administration issued a series of immigration-related 
                                                           
12. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(2)(B) (2017); Koh, supra note 10, at 209–15.  
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (2017); Koh, supra note 10, at 214–18; Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving 
Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 
N.C. L. REV. 475 (2013). The federal government appears to have decreased its use of stipulated removal 
orders since approximately 2010, but the statute and regulations remain in place, and stipulated removal 
orders continue to trigger criminal and civil sanctions premised on the existence of a prior removal order.  
14. Koh, supra note 10, at 181. 
15. See BRYAN BAKER & CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2014 7 (2016), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Enforcement_Actions_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
R2TG-6VUK] (reinstatement and expedited removal accounting for 83.4 percent of all removals in fiscal 
year 2014). 
16. See id.  
17. See generally Koh, supra note 10; Wadhia, supra note 10; Family, supra note 10; ACLU, 
supra note 10. See also AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE: THE GROWTH 
OF SUMMARY DEPORTATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), https://www.americanimmigration 
council.org/research/removal-without-recourse-growth-summary-deportations-united-states [https://per 
ma.cc/2KXX-HTD5].  
18. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018), https://twitter.com/real 
DonaldTrump/status/1010900865602019329. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
342 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:337  
 
 
 
executive orders that, read together, lay the groundwork for a period of mass 
deportation and detention.19 The executive orders conveyed significant 
shifts in the Administration’s immigration and border enforcement plans,20 
for instance, by treating nearly all undocumented immigrants (and some 
legal immigrants) as deportation priorities,21 expanding immigration 
detention,22 and encouraging state and local law enforcement collaborations 
with federal immigration enforcement efforts.23 Of the many shifts in 
immigration enforcement policy signaled by these orders, one of the most 
anticipated is the plan to expand the federal government’s ability to use 
expedited removal in the interior United States.24  
Throughout its history, expedited removal has been viewed primarily as 
a border enforcement tool. The government has generally constrained its 
use of expedited removal to persons arriving at ports of entry or for recent 
arrivals apprehended within 100 miles of the border.25 Indeed, defenders of 
expedited removal have emphasized the relatively minimal ties of 
individuals subject to the process.26 That may change in drastic, sudden 
ways under Trump Administration directives. The Administration has 
recommended expanding the use of expedited removal against persons 
anywhere in the United States who are believed to lack over two years’ 
physical presence in the country.27 Expanding expedited removal could 
allow a front-line, nonjudicial officer of a federal immigration agency to 
make adjudicatory assessments on the streets throughout the United 
                                                           
19. Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Border Enforcement 
E.O.]; Exec. Order No. 13,768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) [hereinafter Interior Enforcement 
E.O.]. Implementing memoranda authored by then-Department of Homeland Security Secretary John 
Kelly soon followed. See Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Kevin 
McAleenan, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (Feb. 20, 2017), https://www.dhs. 
gov/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Enforcement-of-the-Immigration-Laws-to-Serve-the-
National-Interest.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT N2-6SYX]. 
20. See generally Jennifer M. Chacon, Immigration and the Bully Pulpit, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 
243 (2017) (discussing implications of immigration executive orders). 
21. Interior Enforcement E.O., at § 5. 
22. Border Enforcement E.O., at § 6.  
23. Interior Enforcement E.O., at § 8.  
24. Border Enforcement E.O. Section 11(c) states: “Pursuant to section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) of 
the INA, the Secretary shall take appropriate action to apply, in his sole and unreviewable discretion, 
the provisions of section 235(b)(1)(A)(i) and (ii) of the INA to the aliens designated under section 
235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II).” See also Koh, supra note 9, at 462–64 (discussing possible expansion of expedited 
removal). 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 66–68 (discussing existing authority to use expedited 
removal). 
26. See, e.g., David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 684–86, 690 (2000). 
27. See supra note 23; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (permitting Attorney General to apply 
expedited removal against certain noncitizens who have “not been admitted or paroled into the United 
States, and who [have] not affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the 
alien has been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately 
prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
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States.28 The fear, anxiety and social disruption already circulating amongst 
immigrants since Trump took office would likely multiply.29  
Even without large-scale regulatory expansion, expedited removal can 
and does routinely impact the deportation of individuals who have 
meaningful ties to the country. Immigration law has long been subject to 
critique for its draconian and unforgiving nature,30 its operation as an 
exception to mainstream constitutional doctrine,31 and its dizzying 
complexity.32 But expedited removal and reinstatement have created a 
subclass of undocumented immigrants for whom these recurring problems 
in immigration law are exacerbated. Individuals caught at the intersection 
of expedited removal and reinstatement of removal are submerged into legal 
black holes—spaces in which executive power is particularly high but 
where accountability and review are almost nonexistent.  
From a process perspective, those caught at the juncture of expedited 
removal and reinstatement receive the worst of several worlds. At the front 
end, the expedited removal process seems designed to produce error and 
arbitrariness, given its closed-door, speedy, and potentially coercive nature. 
At the back end, a cocktail of jurisdictional bars on judicial and habeas 
review deprives noncitizens of any meaningful mechanism to correct for 
error or provide accountability for wrongful agency action. As one court put 
it, the absence of judicial review in the expedited removal context is a 
“proposition of frightening breadth.”33 With expedited removal, “[t]he 
entire process—from the initial decision to convert the person’s status to 
removal—can happen without any check on whether the person understood 
the proceedings, had an interpreter, or enjoyed any other safeguards,” and 
the procedure is “fraught with risk of arbitrary, mistaken, or discriminatory 
                                                           
28. The statute purports to allow the Attorney General to use expedited removal against persons 
who cannot show two years of prior physical presence in the United States, but the Administration could 
limit a future expansion to cases in which persons cannot demonstrate shorter periods of prior residence. 
Depending on the physical presence period, one estimate has concluded that an expansion of expedited 
removal could affect anywhere from approximately 40,000 persons (if limited to ninety days) to more 
than 325,000 persons (if two years’ presence required). See JOSE MAGAÑA-SALGADO, FAIR TREATMENT 
DENIED: THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S TROUBLING ATTEMPT TO EXPAND “FAST-TRACK” 
DEPORTATIONS (June 2017), https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/2017-06-05_ilrc_ report_ 
fair_treatment_denied_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD4Z-XEZW]. 
29. See Chacon, supra note 20; Koh, supra note 9.  
30. See generally Michael Wishnie, Proportionality: The Struggle for Balance in U.S. 
Immigration Policy, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 431 (2011) (asserting that deportation law fails to reflect 
proportionality); Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683 (2009) (same). 
31. See David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. 
U. L. REV. 583, 583 (2017) (observing that “[t]he Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is littered with special 
immigration doctrines that depart from mainstream constitutional norms”). 
32. See, e.g., Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977) (comparing complexity of immigration 
law to “King Minos’s labyrinth in ancient Crete”).  
33. Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 2010).  
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behavior.”34 And reinstatement and expedited removal together seem to 
bring out the worst in each other. Through reinstatement, the expedited 
removal provisions can have never-ending power to deport a person from 
anywhere in the United States. 
The federal judiciary has recognized the structural problems associated 
with expedited removal in particular, but has not intervened due to statutory 
restrictions on judicial and habeas review. The inability of the federal courts 
to ameliorate the excesses of these removals also reveals limitations on the 
ways the judiciary has traditionally incorporated fairness norms into 
immigration cases. For decades, the courts have employed canons of 
statutory construction—particularly constitutional avoidance—in the 
immigration context to reach more fair results while maintaining the 
integrity of the immigration statutes.35 Similarly, despite the fact that many 
mainstream constitutional rights do not apply to immigration proceedings 
due to the courts’ historic treatment of deportation as a civil sanction,36 
procedural due process has served as a gateway to the importation of 
otherwise inapplicable constitutional principles for immigrants.37 These 
tools have, to a large degree, simply not worked in the context of expedited 
removal and reinstatement.38 The absence of review, accountability, and 
rule of law stands in sharp contrast to the courts’ longstanding recognition 
that deportation is a harsh sanction, a deprivation of “all that makes life 
worth living.”39  
But other judicial interventions remain possible—and not yet explored. 
The courts can introduce a small but meaningful check on the reach of the 
expedited removal and reinstatement regime via arbitrary and capricious 
(A&C) review, also known as the requirement that administrative agencies 
demonstrate reasoned decision-making.40 In 2011, the Supreme Court in 
Judulang v. Holder found a Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) policy 
                                                           
34. Id. at 329.  
35. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990).  
36. The seminal Supreme Court case finding that deportation does not rise to the level of criminal 
punishment, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893), has been deeply criticized throughout 
the history of immigration law. Commentators have observed that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), which found that criminal defense counsel have a Sixth 
Amendment duty to accurately advise noncitizen clients of the immigration consequences of a guilty 
plea, has placed pressure upon the longstanding treatment of deportation as a purely civil sanction. See, 
e.g., Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1306 (2011) (arguing 
that Padilla represents turning point in the judiciary’s treatment of deportation as a quasi-criminal 
sanction). 
37. Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law Procedural Surrogates for 
Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992). 
38. See infra Part III.  
39. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
40. See generally infra Part IV.A.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
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on eligibility for a form of immigration relief known as the “212(c) waiver” 
to be arbitrary and capricious.41 In doing so, the Court repeatedly 
emphasized that the Board’s policy—though neither prohibited nor 
sanctioned by statute—failed to display the level of reasoned decision-
making required by mainstream administrative law principles.42 Judulang 
emphasized two important dimensions of arbitrary and capricious review 
upon which an immigration policy might fail: first, when the policy 
empowers individual immigration officers’ charging decisions to 
disproportionately impact deportation outcomes, and second, when the 
policy does not demonstrate a connection to the overall purpose of the 
immigration laws, which includes weighing the fitness of an individual to 
remain in the country.43 By the same logic, this Article suggests that the 
federal courts can invoke arbitrary and capricious review to examine—and 
even invalidate—the use of reinstatement in cases where the only prior 
removal order is an expedited removal order.44  
This Article seeks to highlight the problems associated with the collision 
of the expedited removal and reinstatement processes, particularly for 
persons with existing ties to the United States, and to provide a partial 
antidote by way of arbitrary and capricious review in the federal courts. Part 
I provides necessary background on the operation of expedited removal and 
reinstatement, as well as recurring criticisms, such as the deprivation of 
administrative hearings, delegation of authority to front-line officers, and 
restrictions on substantive immigration relief. Part II describes the tangle of 
statutory provisions that operate to choke off meaningful review in the 
federal courts, which results in less accountability for the agencies tasked 
with implementing expedited removal and reinstatement. Part III describes 
how the traditional tools used by courts in the immigration context, namely 
constitutional avoidance and statutory arguments, together with procedural 
due process claims, have largely failed to tame the excesses of expedited 
removal and reinstatement. Part IV argues that arbitrary and capricious 
review offers an untested but meaningful avenue for the courts to reexamine 
the specific interaction of reinstatement and expedited removal orders, 
notwithstanding the jurisdictional bars that otherwise exist in the statutes 
and case law. Specifically, I argue that under the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Judulang v. Holder, the federal courts can find reinstated 
removal orders to be arbitrary and capricious where they are predicated 
solely upon a prior expedited removal order. Although the arbitrary and 
capricious arguments described here may depend on the facts of individual 
                                                           
41. 565 U.S. 42 (2011). 
42. Id. 
43. Id.  
44. See infra at Part IV.A. 
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cases, Judulang gives reason to question the use of all reinstatements based 
on expedited removal as a categorical matter. While the scope of this Article 
still leaves much larger questions about the constitutionality of judicial 
review limitations unresolved, judicial interventions under Judulang would 
ameliorate some of the reach of the expedited removal-reinstatement 
interplay. 
I. WHEN SHADOW REMOVALS COLLIDE: UNDERSTANDING EXPEDITED 
REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL 
This Part provides a fundamental overview of how expedited removal 
and reinstatement of removal work. It does so by first describing the “most 
formal process”45 available to an immigrant facing deportation: regular 
removal proceedings in immigration court. It then explores expedited 
removal, which provides strikingly less process and has generally been 
understood as a border enforcement tool for persons seeking initial entry to 
the United States. By next focusing on reinstatement of removal, this Part 
establishes how the expedited removal provisions can impact a significant 
number of people beyond the border as well as the unwillingness of the 
courts to curb the reinstatement process’s reliance on expedited removal.  
A. Regular Removal Proceedings  
Regular removal proceedings that take place before the immigration 
courts are no model of procedural fairness, and yet the truncated process 
associated with expedited removal and reinstatement falls far short of what 
noncitizens receive in immigration court.46 Section 240 of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) sets forth the procedural requirements that 
accompany immigration court proceedings.47 Section 240 provides for a 
right to counsel (at the immigrant’s own expense),48 the right to call and 
cross-examine witnesses, the right to appeal, and some rights to judicial 
                                                           
45. Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2018).  
46. For a more detailed overview of regular removal proceedings, see Koh, supra note 10, at 
188–93.  
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2017).  
48. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration 
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2015) (discussing empirical study of access to counsel in immigration 
court). In some jurisdictions, local governments have begun to fund “universal representation” programs 
in which every person with an immigration court case is assigned an immigration attorney if they cannot 
afford one. See Jose Olivares, More Jurisdictions to Provide Legal Defense for Immigrants at Risk of 
Deportation, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/11/12 
/563557712/more-jurisdictions-to-provide-legal-defense-for-immigrants-at-risk-of-deportatio [https:// 
perma.cc/BH7Q-KVD4]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2018] WHEN SHADOW REMOVALS COLLIDE 347 
 
 
 
review.49 The protections of the procedural due process clause also apply in 
immigration court. Regular removal proceedings are adjudicated by 
immigration judges (IJs) who are attorneys, take an oath to do justice as IJs, 
and are required by regulation to advise noncitizens of any apparent 
eligibility for immigration relief.50 The government is represented by 
attorneys for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), who have 
training in immigration law and, as members of the legal profession, swear 
to uphold the Constitution and follow basic norms of professional 
responsibility governing lawyers.51 The noncitizen can contest the 
government’s charges of removability. Normally, even a person who is 
removable in immigration court can still seek relief from removal if they are 
statutorily eligible to do so, for instance, by seeking cancellation of removal 
or certain waivers of specific grounds of removability.52 The adjudication 
of a case can take months, if not years.53  
The law recognizes that removal orders issued by IJs may be the product 
of error or incomplete factual assessments. Provisions to administratively 
reopen removal orders entered by IJs—for instance, if the facts or law have 
changed—exist as of right, albeit with limitations.54 The proceedings are 
recorded, so that an administrative record can be compiled for 
administrative or judicial review.55 A right to appeal administratively to the 
                                                           
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a; Koh, supra note 13, at 485–88 (discussing application of procedural due 
process in regular removal proceedings).   
50. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ETHICS AND 
PROFESSIONALISM GUIDE FOR IMMIGRATION JUDGES 1–2 (2011), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/23/EthicsandProfessionalismGuideforIJs.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ6A-V9R 
C]; 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2). 
51. Jason Cade, The Challenge of Seeing Justice Done in Removal Proceedings, 89 TUL. L. REV. 
1, 5–8, 16–28 (2014) (examining the role of the ICE’s OPLA attorneys in the immigration court system).  
52. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a) (2017) (describing several types of cancellation of removal).  
53. The existence of immigration court backlogs is a mixed bag for respondents. On one hand, 
requiring immigrants to wait in limbo for years to receive an initial legal judgment with respect to their 
deportation cases produces high levels of anxiety among immigrants, impacts the availability of 
evidence and the reliability of testimony, and can have other negative consequences for the noncitizen. 
See, e.g., Jeanne Kuang, Immigration Court Backlogs Keep Asylum Seekers in Limbo for Years, WASH. 
POST (June 6, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-immigration-cases-back 
log-met-20160605-story.html [https://perma.cc/3CTZ-ESP3]. On the other hand, the waiting time 
associated with immigration court is arguably an impediment to the government’s deportation goals, 
provides some individuals with an opportunity to receive immigration relief through applications filed 
with USCIS, and in other cases provides additional time in the U.S. that is of value to the noncitizen. 
See, e.g., Julia Preston, Deluged Immigration Courts, Where Cases Stall for Years, Begin to Buckle, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/01/us/deluged-immigration-courts-
where-cases-stall-for-years-begin-to-buckle.html [https://perma.cc/2349-CL24] (“The [immigration] 
courts will be a major obstacle for President-elect Donald J. Trump and his plans to deport as many as 
three million immigrants he says have criminal records . . . . [because] [m]any of those deportations—
at least hundreds of thousands—would have to be approved by immigration judges.”).  
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(7) (2017).  
55. Immigration court proceedings were recorded on analog tapes until a digital recording system 
was introduced in 2010. See Press Release, Executive Office for Immigration Review, EOIR Completes 
Digital Audio Recording Implementation, (Sept. 2, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pag 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
348 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:337  
 
 
 
BIA exists.56 The right to seek judicial review over questions of law and 
constitutional questions, and over questions of fact and discretionary 
determinations in certain circumstances, exists as well.57 While imperfect 
and incomplete, removal proceedings in immigration courts thus provide a 
measure of due process and an expectation of fairness.  
Still, immigration court-based adjudication suffers from a number of 
structural deficiencies that undermine basic fairness principles for many 
immigrants.58 Critics have described immigration courts as sites of 
“assembly-line injustice,”59 arbitrariness,60 and severe under-resourcing.61 
Disparities abound, both amongst individual IJs and across immigration 
courts in different geographic regions.62 The absence of counsel leads to 
diminished accountability, so that the rights and remedies available to many 
noncitizens often go unrealized. When individuals are detained, their ability 
to receive a fair process in immigration court is also severely undermined.63 
The Trump Administration has imposed stringent case completion quotas 
on IJs and also restricted their ability to use basic case management tools, 
                                                           
es/attachments/2015/08/20/eoircompletesdar09022010.pdf [https://perma.cc/76DT-82MQ].  
56. For a critique of decisional independence at the BIA, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation 
and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369 (2006). 
57. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2017). The 1996 immigration laws limited judicial review 
of immigration court-based removal orders in various ways and have been the subject of extensive 
scholarly critique. See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial 
Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1412–15 (1997).  
58. See Koh, supra note 10, at 191–93 (describing deficiencies in immigration court); Stephen 
H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L. J. 1635, 1640 (2010); Jayashri 
Srikantiah, David Hausman & Lisa Weissman-Ward, Access to Justice for Immigrant Families and 
Communities: A Study of Legal Representation of Detained Immigrants in Northern California, 11 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 207 (2015); ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: 
PROPOSALS TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE 
ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES (2010).  
59. APPLESEED & CHICAGO APPLESEED, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE: BLUEPRINT TO REFORM 
AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS (2009), http://www.appleseednetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/05/Assembly-Line-Injustice-Blueprint-to-Reform-Americas-Immigration-Courts1.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/ZS4X-HFS5].  
60. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007); Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration 
and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1127, 1160–61 (2016) (discussing arbitrariness 
in immigration enforcement, including in court-based removals). 
61. Memorandum from Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges 2 (Oct. 
2009), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/NAIJ%20Priorities%20Short%20List%20-%20October%202 
009.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2C4-26BF] (describing immigration courts as places in which cases with 
death penalty-like consequences are adjudicated with the resources of traffic court). 
62. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 60, at 372–73; Elise Foley, Here’s Why Atlanta is One 
of the Worst Places to be an Undocumented Immigrant, HUFF. POST (May 25, 2016), https://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/entry/deportation-raids-immigration-courts_us_574378d9e4b0613b512b0f37 [http 
s://perma.cc/MKM2-WDYF] (comparing rates of denials in Atlanta, GA-based immigration court to 
national statistics). 
63. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Naturalizing Immigration Imprisonment, 103 
CALIF. L. REV. 1449 (2015). 
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such the administrative closure of cases.64 And yet for all of the valid and 
unresolved critiques of immigration court, shadow removal processes are 
significantly worse from a process and fairness perspective.65  
B. Expedited Removal at the Border and Beyond 
Expedited removal, by contrast to regular removal proceedings, relies on 
front-line immigration officers—who are neither judges nor attorneys—to 
carry out the entire removal process from beginning to end. Eligibility for 
otherwise common forms of immigration relief fails to serve as protection 
from the issuance of a removal order. Indeed, in expedited removal, the only 
way for a person to avoid expedited removal is to establish that they have a 
credible fear of returning to their home country or have already been granted 
immigration status, such as lawful permanent residence or asylum.66 The 
process takes an average of ninety minutes,67 even though expedited 
removal orders issued by those officers carry the full force and effect of a 
removal order adjudicated by an IJ, such that criminal and civil penalties 
upon re-entry as well as bars to future entry apply.68 As discussed in Part II, 
the process is almost entirely insulated from judicial or even administrative 
review, thereby leaving little room for accountability or correction for error.  
Enacted in 1996 as part of broader immigration legislation that 
transformed and harshened much of the modern deportation framework, 
expedited removal has functioned primarily as a tool of border enforcement 
against individuals arriving at ports of entry either with false documents or 
no entry documents.69 The federal government has expanded its authority to 
use expedited removal several times since its statutory enactment.70 It has 
also implemented its expanded authority unevenly, at times focusing on 
                                                           
64. EOIR Performance Plan: Adjudicative Employees, Nat’l Pub. Radio, https://apps.npr.org/ 
documents/document.html?id=4429792-PWP-Element-3-New (setting forth benchmarks for case 
completion); Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271 (A.G. 2018) (finding that immigration judges lack authority 
to administratively close cases absent previous regulation or judicially approved settlement). 
65. See Koh, supra note 10, at 222–32. 
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2017).  
67. RANDY CAPPS, FAYE HIPSMAN, & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, 
ADVANCES IN U.S.-MEXICO BORDER ENFORCEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE CONSEQUENCE DELIVERY 
SYSTEM 3 (2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/advances-us-mexico-border-enforcement-
review-consequence-delivery-system [https://perma.cc/3EJQ-9VAP]. 
68. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A), (C) (2017) (bars to re-entry following removal order). 
69. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 61225(b) (2017). 
70. For the first roughly six years after the law went into effect, expedited removal was limited 
to individuals arriving at official ports of entry who lacked documents or presented false documents. In 
2002, DHS announced its intent to apply expedited removal against noncitizens arriving by sea who 
failed to meet certain prior residence requirements. In 2004, expedited removal was extended to anyone 
apprehended within one hundred miles of the border if they entered within fourteen days prior to 
apprehension. Similar expansions were made in 2005 and 2006. See Koh, supra note 10, at 197–98 
(discussing prior regulatory expansions of expedited removal).  
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particular geographic regions for the use of expedited removal while 
continuing the use of gentler sanctions in others.71 Under current regulation, 
federal immigration agents can use expedited removal against persons 
apprehended at the border, within 100 miles of the border if they cannot 
show a prior entry more than fourteen days in advance, or even within two 
years of entry if they arrived at an unauthorized entry point by sea.72 The 
federal government has not yet implemented expedited removal to the full 
extent authorized by statute, although the Trump Administration has 
indicated that it plans to increase its authority to use expedited removal73—
a move that will almost certainly be challenged in federal court.74 
Expedited removal is now the norm at the border. Although the expedited 
removal provisions were enacted into law in 1996, their implementation has 
been more gradual. In fiscal year 2014, expedited removals accounted for 
forty-two percent of all removals. As a point of comparison, in 2005 they 
were roughly eighteen percent of all removals.75 One common civil 
alternative to expedited removal is voluntary return.76 As the name 
“voluntary return” suggests, persons agree to return to their country of 
origin without receiving a formal order of removal, thereby exempting them 
from the potential civil and criminal sanctions associated with an expedited 
                                                           
71. For instance, in 2006, the majority of all expedited removals (eighty-one percent) were issued 
in three offices (Phoenix, San Antonio and San Diego). See Aaron Terrazas, Immigration Enforcement 
in the United States, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Oct. 8, 2008), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ 
immigration-enforcement-united-states-2 [https://perma.cc/GDP9-6EF7]. 
72. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877, 48880–81 (Aug. 11, 2004) 
(expanding expedited removal to include aliens “encountered by an immigration officer within 100 air 
miles of any U.S. international land border, and who have not established to the satisfaction of an 
immigration officer that they have been physically present in the U.S. continuously for the 14-day period 
immediately prior to the date of encounter”).  
73. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. See also Geoffrey A. Hoffman, Contiguous 
Territories: The Expanded Use of “Expedited Removal” in the Trump Era (forthcoming 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3107737 [https:// perma.cc/T4G8-SDC4]. 
74. Despite the statutory prohibitions on judicial review discussed infra at Part II, a federal court 
challenge raising constitutional and statutory claims with respect to the anticipated expansion of 
expedited removal would be possible if the action is filed in the District Court of the District of Columbia 
within 60 days of implementation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3); Oluwadamilola E. Obaro, Expedited 
Removal and Statutory Time Limits on Judicial Review of Agency Rules, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2132 (2017). 
75. See Doris Meissner, The Changing Face of Immigration Enforcement, 30 J. L. & POL. 495, 
498 (2015) (“As recently as 2005, the general practice at the border was voluntary return, [representing] 
about 82% of people who were repatriated from the border. Today, that has fallen to about 20%.”).  
76. For persons with prior expedited removal orders, CBP can issue reinstatements at the border. 
Border agents have additional enforcement mechanisms available to them other than expedited removal 
and voluntary returns. See CAPPS et al., supra note 67, at 77. For instance, they can issue a Notice to 
Appear, placing the migrant in regular removal proceedings before an immigration judge. Reinstatement 
is frequently used at the border, where a person has a prior removal order. Border agents sometimes use 
the Alien Transfer Exit Program (ATEP) to physically deport migrants through different geographic 
regions from the ones in which they were apprehended (a practice that appears to have decreased since 
2014). And through Operation Streamline, border officers can refer migrants to criminal prosecution for 
illegal entry and re-entry. See Joanna Jacobbi Lydgate, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation 
Streamline, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 481 (2010). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2018] WHEN SHADOW REMOVALS COLLIDE 351 
 
 
 
removal upon future entry.77 In 2011, CBP developed an internal protocol 
known as the Consequence Delivery System (CDS), which is intended to 
provide guidance to CBP agents on how to respond to border apprehensions, 
based on factors such as the number of prior apprehensions, criminal 
history, and human smuggling allegations.78 The CDS, which by 2017 
appear to have been used nationally across all CBP sectors, discourages the 
use of voluntary return in all cases, irrespective of prior criminal or 
immigration history.79 While the CDS guidance is not uniformly 
implemented, it demonstrates the agency’s recent prioritization of expedited 
removal over voluntary return. Voluntary return, though discouraged, has 
continued in use but has decreased over the past several years.80  
From the perspective of a migrant at the border, expedited removal and 
voluntary return may not feel meaningfully different. In both cases, 
immigration officials apprehend the person. Expedited removal may 
involve an additional hour or two of processing time in comparison to 
voluntary return,81 but even some of the procedural markers of expedited 
removal—an interview by a border agent, fingerprinting, and an oral 
                                                           
77. See, e.g., ALISON SISKIN & RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33109, 
IMMIGRATION POLICY ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL OF ALIENS 7 (2005) (“The majority of aliens 
apprehended along the southwest border are Mexican nationals who are ‘voluntarily’ returned to Mexico 
without a formal removal hearing.”). The practice of offering administrative voluntary return to 
individuals seeking admission at U.S. ports of entry has raised similar concerns related to CBP officers 
providing misinformation, language barriers, and the use of coercive tactics to persuade individuals to 
accept voluntary return, as described by the allegations in Lopez-Venegas v. Napolitano. Complaint at 
1–2, Lopez-Venegas v. Napolitano, No. 13-cv-03972 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2013). The terms “voluntary 
return” and “voluntary departure” have been used in the immigration literature and by the government 
interchangeably at times to refer to any process in which a person is permitted to leave the US without 
receiving a formal removal order. Consistent with prevailing practice, this Article uses the phrase 
“voluntary return” to refer to the practice of border officers allowing migrants to voluntarily withdraw 
their applications for admissions without the penalty of a removal at the border. By contrast, this Article 
reserves the phrase “voluntary departure” for cases taking place in the interior United States, where a 
person agrees to leave the country and—similar to voluntary return—avoid the entry of a formal order 
of removal. Unlike voluntary return, voluntary departure, when used within the United States, is subject 
to various limitations and eligibility requirements set forth in the statute. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2017).   
78. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-66, BORDER PATROL: ACTIONS 
NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF POST-APPREHENSION CONSEQUENCES 1 (Jan. 2017), https://www. 
gao.gov/assets/690/682074.pdf [https://perma.cc/YG8C-97HG]. 
79. See id. at 9 (identifying voluntary return as an option, but characterizing it as the “[l]east 
[e]ffective and [e]fficient” option).  
80. CAPPS et al., supra note 67, at 2, 15 (reporting that in FY 2014, 9 percent of apprehended 
migrants were issued voluntary returns, compared to 74 percent who received expedited removal orders; 
by contrast, in FY 2011, 41 percent of apprehended immigrants received voluntary returns and 59 
percent received expedited removal orders).  
81. The Migration Policy Institute estimates that voluntary return takes “a few minutes” on 
average, while expedited removal may involve an average of 90 minutes of staff time. But with the 
difference between the two procedures being less than two hours, the overall time difference is minimal. 
See id. at 3.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
352 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [VOL. 96:337  
 
 
 
advisal—may be present with voluntary return.82 Coercive tactics by border 
officers and an atmosphere that prevents noncitizens from making informed 
choices may also be present with both outcomes.83 Indeed, attorneys 
working with immigrant clients who have at any point in the past crossed 
the border without a visa often expend considerable time ascertaining 
whether their clients have an expedited removal on their record (versus a 
voluntary return), given the differing legal consequences.84  
From an enforcement perspective, the purpose of expedited removal is 
to increase the legal sanctions associated with unauthorized entry to the 
United States as well as the penalties for future re-entry, and to do so 
efficiently.85 Defenders of expedited removal have emphasized that the 
minimal procedure involved with expedited removal, such as providing a 
process for credible fear interviews and for identifying U.S. citizens or 
lawful permanent residents (LPRs), is enough to prevent error.86 One 
argument presented by those favoring expedited removal has been that 
because the process focuses generally on individuals seeking entry at the 
border, the process targets those with relatively lower stakes in the 
country.87 As Professor David Martin has asserted, “in most cases involving 
[expedited removal] at the ports of entry, the stakes for the applicant for 
admission are low.”88 Professor Martin’s rationale is that border entrants 
have generally not yet established ties in the United States. Furthermore, he 
explains, if ties to the country do exist, persons who are not LPRs or U.S. 
citizens “would generally lack a legitimate entitlement to resume those 
connections.”89  
But the argument that most border arrivals have little at stake, thereby 
justifying the use of expedited removal, avoids the question of whether a 
significant number of people subject to expedited removal might actually 
                                                           
82. See Lopez-Venegas Complaint, supra note 75, at 9-11 (describing procedure used to 
implement voluntary return as including the presentation of forms during oral encounters between border 
officers and noncitizens). 
83. See Complaint, supra note 77.  
84. See, e.g., EVANGELINE ABRIEL & SALLY KINOSHITA, THE VAWA MANUAL 10–20 (2014) 
(“The advocate should ask the client about any prior contact with immigration and ask to see any 
documents the client has, but the advocate may also need to do additional investigation” to ascertain the 
existence of a prior removal order).  
85. Martin, supra note 26, at 675. See also The Southern Border in Crisis: Resources and 
Strategies to Improve National Security: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border 
Sec. & Citizenship and the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 3, 24 (2005) (statement of David Aguilar, Chief, Office of Border Patrol) 
(explaining that with expedited removal, once the determination that a person lacks a claim to enter the 
United States, “these people are rapidly removed out of the country without an immigration judge 
coming into play”). 
86. See Martin, supra note 26, at 683, 687 n.47, 692–94. 
87. Id. at 684–86, 690–91. 
88. Id. at 690. 
89. Id. 
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have meaningful ties to the United States. Relatedly, it fails to address 
whether the existence of an expedited removal order in the past should 
categorically preclude those people from developing legally cognizable ties 
to the country in the future. In theory, the existence of a prior order could 
make a noncitizen’s subsequent entry to the United States more 
objectionable. However, the flimsy manner in which expedited removal 
takes place—speedy adjudications, a lack of formal process, 
implementation in detention centers—undermines the notion that a 
noncitizen with a prior expedited removal is less capable of developing 
meaningful ties that carry weight.  
In light of international refugee treaty obligations, the expedited removal 
statute prohibits the immediate removal of any person who expresses a fear 
of returning to their home country. If a person indicates such a fear, then 
officials “shall” refer them for an interview known as a credible fear 
determination, in which an officer must assess whether their fear of 
persecution is credible.90 If they articulate an adequately credible fear in the 
interview, they are referred to immigration court proceedings for 
adjudication of their asylum case.91 If the officer conducting the credible 
fear interview determines that the fear described is not sufficient, they may 
seek review by an IJ to evaluate the negative credible fear determination.92 
But if an IJ upholds the officer’s assessment, then neither the statute nor 
regulations permit any further judicial or administrative review.93 Unless the 
officer’s negative credible fear determination is overturned, the individual 
will receive an expedited removal order that remains on their immigration 
record forever. The regulations also prohibit the use of expedited removal 
on persons who claim to be U.S. citizens, LPRs, or recipients of asylum 
status.94 Nothing in the statute, regulations, or agency policy prevents the 
use of expedited removal on persons with histories of prior residence in the 
United States, with cognizable claims to permanent residence, or even with 
immigration status that is other than lawful permanent residence or asylee 
status (such as a nonimmigrant visa or Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA)).  
A major critique of expedited removal has centered on its failure to 
properly identify asylum seekers fleeing persecution in foreign countries. It 
seems that border officials have failed to even follow the rudimentary 
procedures required by statute and regulation. The most well-known review 
of border patrol’s adherence to federal procedures in expedited removal 
                                                           
90. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I)–(III) (2017).   
91. Id.   
92. Id.  
93. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.42(f). 
94. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5). 
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comes from the United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom (USCIRF), which conducted periodic studies from 1998 until 
2016.95 Each time, the USCIRF found serious failures by border officials to 
follow the required procedures, such as failing to read relevant portions of 
the immigration forms that advise entrants of the rights and protections 
associated with seeking asylum,96 failing to ask questions about fear 
required by regulatory protocol,97 documenting on-the-record exchanges in 
an erroneous or incomplete manner,98 or failing to allow individuals to 
review their written statements.99 In yet other cases observed by the 
USCIRF, even where persons did express fear of return, officers failed to 
refer them for credible fear interviews, as required by regulation.100  
Even decades after the introduction of expedited removal, report after 
report has documented instances of border officials refusing to properly 
identify valid asylum claims or otherwise follow required protocols.101 One 
of the most common complaints is that CBP officers do not ask migrants 
whether they fear returning to their home country. Additionally, CBP 
officers have reportedly actively discouraged individuals from seeking 
asylum through the credible fear process through a wide range of actions, 
including misinforming them that asylum is not available, verbal abuse and 
outright physical intimidation (including physically moving individuals out 
                                                           
95. For an excellent analysis of the USCIRF studies, see Stephen Manning & Kari Hong, Getting 
it Righted: Access to Counsel in Rapid Removals, forthcoming MARQ. L. REV. (2018) (draft on file with 
author). 
96. In approximately half of the cases observed by the Commission, CBP officers failed to read 
relevant portions of Form I-867A, despite the fact that persons who heard the information on the form 
were seven times more likely to express a fear if given the advisal. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: VOLUME I: FINDINGS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS 51 (2005).  
97. See id. at 15–17. See also Brief of Refugee and Human Rights Organizations and Scholars 
as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (2017) 
(No. 16-812).  
98. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, BARRIERS TO PROTECTION: THE 
TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL 19 (2016). 
99. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 96, at 57 (noting that in three-
fourths of observed cases, asylum seekers were not given an opportunity to review and correct 
statements).  
100. Id. at 54 (noting that in fifteen percent of observed cases, asylum seekers expressing fear of 
return were not referred for credible fear interviews). 
101. See, e.g., B. SHAW DRAKE, ELEANOR ACER & OLGA BYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, 
CROSSING THE LINE: U.S. BORDER AGENTS ILLEGALLY REJECT ASYLUM SEEKERS (2017); CLARA 
LONG, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, YOU DON’T HAVE RIGHTS HERE: U.S. BORDER SCREENINGS AND 
RETURNS OF CENTRAL AMERICANS TO SERIOUS HARM, (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/20 
14/10/16/you-dont-have-rights-here/us-border-screening-and-returns-central-americans-risk [https:// 
perma.cc/47QA-YWME]; Am. Immigration Council et al., Re: U.S. Customs and Border Protections 
Systemic Denial of Entry to Asylum Seekers at Ports of Entry on U.S.-Mexico Border (Jan. 13, 2017), 
https://americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/general_litigation/cbp_systemic_denial_of_e
ntry_to_asylum_seekers_advocacy_document.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HZ8-R2M5].  
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of ports of entry),102 and abusive behavior.103 In some places, border patrol 
officials have developed ad hoc procedures to limit the number of 
individuals seeking credible fear interviews at the border, such as through 
“ticketing” systems aimed at discouraging migrants from seeking asylum.104  
Whereas expedited removal’s implementation has long given rise to 
concerns, the Trump Administration’s aggressive border enforcement 
policies have demonstrated that those concerns, when exploited, metastasize 
into rampant denials of procedure and accuracy. Immediately following the 
November 2016 election of Donald Trump, human rights observers 
documented cases in which border patrol officers have invoked the Trump 
presidency to declare that “[President] Trump says we don’t have to let you 
in.”105  
Around April 2018, Attorney General Sessions increased the Trump 
Administration’s public condemnation of groups of migrants seeking 
asylum at the border, known as “caravans.”106 The international human 
rights obligations that inform the credible fear process were further turned 
on their head by the Attorney General’s plans to apply a zero tolerance 
policy of criminal prosecutions for illegal entry and re-entry to all persons 
apprehended near the border.107 By May 2018, the Trump Administration 
had adopted a regular policy of forcibly separating children from their 
parents following apprehension at or near the border.108 Following weeks of 
sharp public outcry, a federal judge ultimately ruled those separations a 
violation of due process.109 By July 2018, images of children in cages, 
stories of parents struggling to even locate—much less be reunited with— 
their children, and reports of children being held in appalling conditions 
                                                           
102. Complaint, Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Kelly, No. 17-CV-5111, *1, 26–29, 32 (C.D. Cal. 2017).  
103. Id. at *1, 26–29, 41. 
104. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 101, at 9; Amnesty Int’l, Facing Walls: USA and Mexico’s 
Violation of the Rights of Asylum Seekers, AMNESTY INT’L (June 15, 2017), https://www.amnesty 
usa.org/reports/facing-walls-usa-mexicos-violation-rights-asylum-seekers/ [https://perma.cc/EGV5-VS 
RH].  
105. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 101, at 1.  
106. Press Release No. 18-553, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces First 
Criminal Illegal Entry Prosecutions of Suspected Caravan Members (May 1, 2018), https://www. 
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-first-criminal-illegal-entry-prosecutions-suspected-
caravan [https://perma.cc/UE7G-UPDG]. 
107. Id. 
108. Mary Louise Kelly, How The Trump Administration’s Family Separation Policy Is Playing 
Out, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/28/615010170/how-the-trump-
administrations-family-separation-policy-is-playing-out [https://perma.cc/NP4A-5LW9]. Prior to the 
actual separation of families, border officials had reportedly used the threat of separation to coerce 
parents into withdrawing their asylum claims. See WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N ET AL., BETRAYING 
FAMILY VALUES: HOW IMMIGRATION POLICY AT THE UNITED STATES BORDER IS SEPARATING 
FAMILIES (2017), https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/IM-CA-0092-0001.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/772V-9SXG]. 
109. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Ms. L. v. ICE, 
No. 18-CV-0428 (S.D. Cal. June 6, 2018). 
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flooded the media.110 Against this backdrop, on June 11, 2018, Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions issued Matter of A-B-, a Board of Immigration 
Appeals decision he certified to himself, and that purported to significantly 
restrict most asylum claims based on domestic violence and other forms of 
private criminal activity.111 One of the most wide-reaching and likely 
impacts of A-B- is that far more individuals will receive expedited removal 
in the near future, because under the far more stringent asylum standards set 
forth in A-B-, they will be denied at the credible fear stage and prohibited 
from seeking asylum in immigration court.112  
Despite the national attention directed towards immigration policies at 
the border and debates around the U.S. government’s role in facilitating 
widespread abuse of children, expedited removal remains an understudied 
area that is ripe for deeper research and review. The expedited removal 
regime arguably fails to even abide by the minimal international treaty 
protections that it claims to preserve. Put differently, expedited removal is 
flawed not only for its procedural shortcomings, but with respect to the 
implementation of its substantive provisions as well. But in addition to 
problems taking place at or near the border, the consequences of expedited 
removal and the harshness of the overall legal framework extend beyond 
the border and into the lives of immigrants in the United States.  
C. Reinstatement of Prior Removal Orders 
Like expedited removal, reinstatement of removal allows the 
government to swiftly deport a person without ever providing them with a 
hearing before a neutral adjudicator. Any person who was previously 
removed—whether through an expedited removal order issued within a day 
or one issued after a full presentation of the person’s legal claims—and 
subsequently enters without permission, can be reinstated for removal.113 
                                                           
110. See, e.g., Miriam Jordan et al., As Migrant Families are Reunited, Some Children Don’t 
Recognize Their Mothers, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2018); Aura Bogado, Ziva Branstetter & Vanessa 
Swales, Defense Contractor Detained Migrant Kids in Vacant Phoenix Office Building, REVEAL NEWS 
(July 6, 2018), https://www.revealnews.org/article/defense-contractor-detained-migrant-kids-in-vacant-
phoenix-office-building/.  
111. Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018). 
112. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., POLICY 
MEMORANDUM, GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND 
REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF A-B- 10 (July 11, 2018), https://www. 
uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2018/2018-06-18-PM-602-0162-USCIS-Memo 
randum-Matter-of-A-B.pdf [https://perma.cc/385R-JEWW] (“Officers should be alert that under the 
standards clarified in Matter of A-B-, few gang-based or domestic-violence claims involving particular 
social groups defined by the members’ vulnerability to harm may merit a grant of asylum or refugee 
status—or pass the ‘significant possibility’ test in credible fear screenings . . . or the ‘reasonable 
possibility’ test in reasonable fear screenings.”). 
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012). 
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The reinstatement statute and regulations do not limit the types of removal 
orders that can serve as predicate orders to reinstatement. When an order is 
reinstated, the immigrant has “no right to a hearing before an immigration 
judge,”114 and, similar to expedited removal, their substantive defenses to 
removal are limited.115 If the individual articulates a fear of returning to their 
home country and demonstrates a “reasonable fear” of return in an interview 
with an asylum officer, they can seek withholding of removal or Convention 
Against Torture relief.116 The statute purports to bar them from seeking any 
other forms of relief from removal in court, even if otherwise available 
under the immigration statute, including asylum.117 As one court put it, the 
“reinstatement process offers virtually no procedural protections,” 
providing “nothing more than a chance to make a statement opposing 
reinstatement to an immigration officer (not a judge).” 118 Unlike regular 
removal, reinstatement is a process that “guarantees the alien no notice . . . 
, affords him no real opportunity to contest the facts underlying the 
reinstatement, and contemplates no presentation of evidence.”119 And given 
that the reinstatement statute carries no statute of limitations,120 persons who 
have entered the United States after any removal order are what I have 
described previously as “forever deportable.”121  
The federal government drastically boosted its reliance on reinstatement 
to increase deportations throughout the Bush and Obama Administrations, 
and will likely continue to do so to further Trump’s deportation agenda.122 
The reinstatement process is heavily one-sided and favors the government. 
The burden on immigration officials to implement a reinstatement is 
remarkably low, requiring a showing of only three elements: (1) the 
existence of a prior removal order, (2) that the noncitizen’s identity matches 
that of the prior removal order, and (3) the fact of the subsequent unlawful 
                                                           
114. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) (2016). 
115. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(d) (stating that reinstatement orders will not apply to individuals granted 
adjustment of status applications under the Haitian Refugee Immigrant Fairness Act of 1998 or the 
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(c)(5)(i) (clarifying that  
grant of U-1 nonimmigrant status cancels prior removal orders issued by immigration officers who are 
not IJs). 
116. Similar to expedited removal, the officer’s negative reasonable fear determination can be 
reviewed by an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 208.31. 
117. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2017) (“[T]he alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief 
under this chapter”); Matter of L-M-P-, 27 I&N Dec. 265 (BIA 2018) (holding that an applicant in 
withholding-only proceedings and subject to a reinstated order is not eligible for asylum).   
118. Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 24 n.6 (1st Cir. 2004). 
119. Id. 
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2017) (permitting reinstatement “at any time after reentry”).  
121. Koh, supra note 10, at 203, 206.  
122. Reinstatement experienced a roughly 270 percent increase in use from fiscal years 2005 to 
2013. AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, REMOVAL WITHOUT RECOURSE: THE GROWTH OF SUMMARY 
DEPORTATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/site 
s/default/files/research/removal_without_recourse.pdf [https://perma.cc/28H9-WG9V].  
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reentry.123 As a result, the reinstatement process moves quickly, making it 
extremely difficult to challenge the legality of the process or of the prior 
order. As one attorney put it, “We see reinstatements left and right, but how 
can you unwind all of this in 24 hours?”124 The law nonetheless views 
individuals solely through the lens of their prior removal (no matter how 
long in the past), while giving no weight to the equities and ties that might 
have developed (such as family relationships, or integration into business or 
social communities). Once a person receives a reinstatement—whether at 
the border or in the interior of the United States—that reinstatement order 
can also be reinstated an unlimited number of times. As a result, significant 
portions of the immigrant population live at risk of immediate deportation 
at any time. For those individuals, the risks of affirmatively seeking 
immigration relief, such as pursuing one’s green card through an immediate 
family member, are high because their vulnerability to reinstatement means 
that the end result of any contact with immigration authorities may be 
summary deportation.125 
The decision to place a noncitizen in reinstatement versus regular 
removal proceedings is a purely discretionary one that lies with a front-line 
charging officer or, in some cases, with an attorney from the Office of Chief 
Counsel within ICE. Nothing in the reinstatement statute or regulations 
requires that agency officials use reinstatement in lieu of regular removal 
proceedings. As the Ninth Circuit has stated, “‘[r]einstatement of a prior 
order of removal is not automatic’ . . . Nor is it obligatory.”126 Accordingly, 
“ICE agents, to whom § 1231(a)(5) delegates the decision to reinstate a prior 
removal order, may exercise their discretion not to pursue streamlined 
reinstatement procedures.”127 As Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia has 
explained, existing agency policy does not direct agency officials to weigh 
equitable factors such as length of prior residence, family or community 
ties, criminal record, or other factors.128 Wadhia has argued persuasively in 
favor of adopting prosecutorial discretion policies that would compel 
officers to take such factors into account before placing individuals in 
                                                           
123. Id. at 4.  
124. ACLU, supra note 10, at 84 (quoting attorney Ken McGuire). 
125. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 506 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (a “typical reinstatement case” involves a noncitizen who “has married a United States 
citizen and makes an appointment with the agency to discuss adjustment of status or an extension of a 
previously granted work authorization”). 
126. Villa-Anguiano v. Holder, 727 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Alcala v. Holder, 563 
F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir.2009)). See also id. (“[A]n ICE officer may decide to forgo reinstatement of a 
prior order of removal in favor of initiating new removal proceedings”).  
127. Id. at 879. 
128. Wadhia, supra note 10, at 24 (describing internal agency documents that encourage officers 
to use reinstatement and other forms of summary removal over NTAs to the extent possible). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2018] WHEN SHADOW REMOVALS COLLIDE 359 
 
 
 
reinstatement.129  
The rudimentary process afforded during reinstatement is entirely 
premised on the existence of a previously executed removal order, but the 
statute also restricts the noncitizen’s opportunities to challenge the validity 
of that prior order during the reinstatement process. The reinstatement 
statute states that the prior order “is not subject to being reopened or 
reviewed.”130 By contrast, where the government seeks to criminally 
prosecute an individual for illegal re-entry, the Constitution requires that the 
immigrant be permitted to bring a collateral challenge against the predicate 
removal order.131 Indeed, some federal courts have examined the validity of 
expedited removals in illegal re-entry prosecutions.132 But reinstatement is 
a civil proceeding, and so courts have rejected a similar right to challenge 
the validity of the prior order during reinstatement.133  
The federal courts have done little to require that the predicate removal 
order underlying a reinstatement of removal demonstrates procedural 
integrity. For the government, arguably all that reinstatement requires is the 
“existence of a prior removal order,” and not its legal or constitutional 
validity.134 It is thus common for one shadow removal proceeding to serve 
as the basis for the reinstatement. Cases in which an immigrant’s 
reinstatement was premised upon an expedited removal have received even 
less scrutiny from courts, which have endorsed the executive’s statutory 
authority to layer one summary removal procedure upon another.135 Such 
cases confirm the fact that these two procedures, acting together, prevent 
even persons with otherwise strong ties to the United States (such as 
eligibility to apply for lawful permanent residence based on an immediate 
family relationship) from receiving meaningful administrative review of 
their claims.136  
                                                           
129. Id. at 22 (arguing that DHS has discretion whether to place an individual in various forms of 
“speed deportation,” referring to expedited removal, administrative removal of non-LPRs with 
aggravated felony convictions, or reinstatement). 
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).  
131. United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987). See also Doug Keller, Rethinking 
Illegal Entry and Re-entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 65 (2012).  
132. See, e.g., United States v. Raya-Vaca, 771 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding due process 
violations in expedited removal order serving as predicate order for illegal re-entry prosecution); United 
States v. Bayardo-Garcia, 590 F. App’x 660, 662 (9th Cir. 2014) (same).  
133. See Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2008).  
134. Id. at 148 (emphasis added). 
135. See, e.g., Garcia de Rincon v. U.S Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2007). 
136. See Garcia de Rincon, 539 F.3d at 1134 (involving noncitizen married to lawful permanent 
resident with two U.S. citizen children, subjected to reinstatement after filing affirmative green card 
application through spouse); Lorenzo, 508 F.3d at 1281 (involving noncitizen who applied for lawful 
permanent residence through spouse eight years after receiving expedited removal order).  
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Undocumented immigrants living in the United States with expedited 
removal orders in their past thus reside at the intersection of two summary 
removal regimes. In theory, the minimal procedure associated with 
reinstatement of removal is justified because the fair adjudication of the 
immigrant’s predicate removal order has already taken place. But where the 
predicate removal order is an expedited removal order, there is reason to 
believe that a fair adjudication never took place. Nonetheless, through 
reinstatement, expedited removal orders have continuing and lasting effects 
on the immigration enforcement agencies’ power to deport and detain. As 
the next Part describes, the right to meaningful administrative or judicial 
review in which the person can challenge errors that might have occurred in 
the initial execution of the expedited removal order is extremely limited 
under the statutory scheme and the subject of unsettled case law.137  
II. LEGAL BLACK HOLES: THE ABSENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Having discussed the nature of expedited removal and reinstatement, 
including the interplay of the two, this Part explores restrictions on judicial 
and habeas review. Those restrictions prevent persons from seeking 
recourse in the federal courts to correct for error in the expedited removal 
process, even while empowering expedited removal to continuously deport 
through reinstatement.  
The upshot is the arguable creation of legal black holes in immigration 
law. The concept of a “legal black hole” is largely undefined, but the basic 
idea is that spaces exist—whether defined spatially or legally—in which 
governmental powers are high but where the law cannot reach, particularly 
where the treatment of persons is concerned.138 The phrase has been invoked 
most frequently in the context of the U.S. military detention complex at 
Guantanamo Bay.139 As this Part demonstrates, expedited removal operates 
                                                           
137. Some attorneys, including the Clinic I direct, have reported success with administrative 
motions to reopen and rescind expedited removal orders that have been filed directly with CBP pursuant 
to 8 C.F.R. § 103.5.  
138. See Ralph Wilde, Legal “Black Hole”? Extraterritorial State Action and International 
Treaty Law on Civil and Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 739, 775 (2006) (“The ‘legal black hole’ 
idea speaks to a fear that” extraterritorial state action may lead to “a partial or complete move away from 
the arena of necessary legal regulation as far as the treatment of individuals is concerned.”).  
139. Id. at 772–75 (discussing legal black hole comparison to Guantanamo and quoting Johan 
Steyn, Guantánamo Bay: the Legal Black Hole, 27th F.A. Mann Lecture (Nov. 27, 2003), in 53 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 1, 8 (2004) as describing detainees in Guantánamo Bay as “beyond the rule of law, beyond 
the protection of any courts,” characterizing Guantanamo as a “legal black hole”). See also Lisa Austin, 
Technological Tattletales and Constitutional Black Holes: Communications Intermediaries and 
Constitutional Constraints, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 451, 451–52 (May 2015) (using black hole 
concept to discuss public and private surveillance, and noting that “[l]aws that treat nonresident aliens 
differently from residents and citizens can create ‘constitutional black holes’ where the communications 
data of an individual is not protected by any constitutional constraints”).  
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with little oversight by the federal courts, and the expedited removal-
reinstatement connection likewise provides negligible opportunities for the 
law to correct for abuse and error. At the ground level, the expedited 
removal and reinstatement procedures are designed to invite abuse by taking 
place in backroom settings, administered by front-line officers with few 
administrative mechanisms for oversight. Yet Congress has insulated the 
very procedures most likely to result in error and abuse from further judicial 
or even habeas review. The layering of one shadow removal upon another 
thus creates an even darker space in immigration law than the operation of 
each process on its own. 
A. Judicial and Habeas Review of Expedited Removal  
The elimination of judicial review—including habeas review—to 
account for the legality of expedited removal is a unique and draconian 
feature of expedited removal. A number of judicial review provisions 
largely eliminate the federal courts’ ability to review and correct for errors 
in the expedited removal process. Immigration laws enacted in 1996 already 
preclude regular federal district court review of judge-issued removal 
orders, and have been the subject of extensive critique and litigation.140 
Those laws do, however, specify that the federal courts of appeal retain 
“sole and exclusive” jurisdiction over removal orders.141 But the 
immigration statute’s general conferral of jurisdiction over removal orders 
with the courts of appeal contains a short yet significant exception: “except 
as provided in subsection (e).”142 That subsection, at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e), 
specifically addresses the availability of judicial review over expedited 
removal orders, and works in concert with other provisions to deprive 
persons of judicial and habeas review in all but the most limited instances.  
8 U.S.C. § 1252(e) contains multiple provisions that prevent individuals 
with expedited removal orders from obtaining federal court review. One 
provision states that “no court” may “enter declaratory, injunctive, or other 
equitable relief” except as permitted by subsection (e).143 That same 
provision bars any court from certifying a class for purposes of a class-
action lawsuit involving expedited removal.144 Courts interpreting these 
                                                           
140. Prior to 1996, federal district court review of removal orders was available. See Lenni B. 
Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 
29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1419–38 (1997) (describing history). 
141. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4). 
142. Id.  
143. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A).  
144. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B) (“[N]o court may . . . certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in any action for which judicial review is authorized under a subsequent 
paragraph of this subsection.”). 
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provisions have read them to bar federal appellate court jurisdiction over 
expedited removal orders.145 Thus, claims that an expedited removal order 
was entered on incorrect factual grounds, or raising due process violations, 
have been rejected on jurisdictional grounds.146  
Beyond containing general bars to judicial review of individual 
expedited removal orders, the statute also takes aim at systematic challenges 
to the broader expedited removal system. Subsection (e)(3) mandates that 
any challenges to “the validity of the [expedited removal] system” be 
brought within 60 days of implementation of any statute, regulation or 
policy,147 be filed only in the federal district court for the District of 
Columbia, and that the claims be limited to constitutional or statutory 
arguments.148 Indeed, immediately following the implementation of the 
expedited removal statute in 1997, subsequent litigation—involving three 
lawsuits consolidated into a single action, American Immigration Lawyers 
Association v. Reno—resulted in the D.C. Circuit upholding the validity of 
the expedited removal framework.149  
Section 1252(a)(2)(A) further singles out expedited removal orders as a 
matter “not subject to judicial review” in the INA.150 That provision is part 
of a broader section addressing removal orders deemed unreviewable by the 
federal courts such as certain discretionary denials of relief or orders against 
“criminal aliens.”151 Although the statute preserves judicial review over 
limited matters, it explicitly strips the courts of jurisdiction over individual 
determinations or Attorney General decisions related to expedited removal 
                                                           
145. Shunaula v. Holder, 732 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2013) (acknowledging that § 1252 “provides for 
limited judicial review of expedited removal orders in habeas corpus proceedings” but otherwise 
deprives the courts of jurisdiction to hear claims related to the implementation or operation of an 
expedited removal order); Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 2010) (declining to review case on 
jurisdictional grounds); Li v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2001) (“With respect to review of expedited 
removal orders, . . . the statute could not be much clearer in its intent to restrict habeas review.”); 
Brumme v. INS, 275 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2001).  
146. See, e.g., Shunaula, 732 F.3d at 143 (an alien’s claims disputing that he sought to enter the 
country through fraud or misrepresentation and asserting that he was not advised that he was in an 
expedited removal proceeding or given the opportunity to consult with a lawyer “f[ell] within this 
jurisdictional bar”); Pena v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 452 (9th Cir. 2015) (denying jurisdiction to review 
expedited removal where allegations of due process violations).   
147. 8 U.S.C § 1252(e)(3)(B) (“Any action instituted under this paragraph must be filed no later 
than 60 days after the date the challenged section, regulation, directive, guideline, or procedure described 
in clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A) is first implemented.”). For further analysis of the 60 -day time 
limit, see Obaro, supra note 74.  
148. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3). 
149. Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also 
Ebba Gebisa, Constitutional Concerns with the Enforcement and Expansion of Expedited Removal, 2007 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 565, 574 (2007) (discussing AILA v. Reno litigation); Obaro, supra note 74, at 2138–
48 (same). 
150. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A).  
151. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (C). 
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orders.152 Courts have relied on section 1252(a)(2)(A), read in combination 
with section 1252(e), to reject arguments that other provisions of the INA 
or common law-based exceptions to statutory restrictions on judicial review 
can give rise to federal court jurisdiction over expedited removal orders.153 
Finally, the statute severely restricts the ability to seek even habeas 
review over expedited removal orders in the federal district courts. 
Throughout the history of the United States, the writ of habeas corpus has 
functioned to preserve federal court review over executive action, 
particularly where no other legal remedy exists.154 While not eliminating it 
altogether, the statute at section 1252(e)(2) states that habeas review “is 
available,” but is limited to three issues: (1) “whether the petitioner is an 
alien,” (2) “whether the petitioner was ordered removed” pursuant to the 
expedited removal provisions, and (3) whether the noncitizen can 
demonstrate that she is a LPR, refugee, or has already been granted 
asylum.155 The courts have read these provisions narrowly when assessing 
jurisdiction over expedited removal orders.156 Furthermore, the only remedy 
available is to be placed in regular removal proceedings before an IJ.157 
The statutory limitations on habeas review of expedited removal raise a 
particularly complex series of questions related to the application of the 
Constitution’s Suspension Clause in the immigration context. The 
Suspension Clause states that “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it.”158 The Supreme Court’s heavily commented-
upon decision in Boumediene v. Bush found that the Suspension Clause 
applies to foreign nationals designated “enemy combatants” at the 
Guantanamo Naval Base (and thus not on U.S. soil),159 and seemed to 
establish a theory of constitutional rights not tethered to either immigration 
status or physical presence in the United States.160 Ironically, despite the 
                                                           
152. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A).  
153. See, e.g., Garcia de Rincon v. U.S Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 
2008) Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 2010); Brumme v. INS, 275 F.3d 443, 447–49 (5th 
Cir. 2001); Turgerel v. Mukasey, 513 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (10th Cir. 2008). 
154. See Brandon L. Garrett, Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 60 (2012) 
(describing historical origins of writ of habeas corpus). 
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).  
156. See Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2016); Shunaula 
v. Holder, 732 F.3d 143, 145–47 (2d Cir. 2013); M.S.P.C. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 60 F. Supp. 
3d 1156, 1163–64 (D.N.M. 2014), vacated as moot, No. 14–769, 2015 WL 7454248 (D.N.M. Sept. 23, 
2015).  
157. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(4).  
158. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
159. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
160. Id. at 753–71; see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After 
Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259, 261 (2009) (“More broadly, Boumediene . . . rejects 
formalistic reliance on single factors, such as nationality or location, as a basis for wholesale denial of 
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invocation of legal black holes to describe Guantanamo, Supreme Court 
intervention since Boumediene has ameliorated concerns regarding the lack 
of meaningful judicial process and review related the detention of enemy 
combatants.161 It would seem that the protections of Boumediene should 
extend to expedited removal, and scholars have put forth strong explorations 
of the role of the Suspension Clause in the immigration context following 
Boumediene.162 Professor Gerald Neuman has suggested that the judicial 
review restrictions associated with expedited removal may violate the 
Suspension Clause in light of Boumediene.163 Relatedly, Professor Carolina 
Núñez has explored broader questions of how physical presence and 
attachments to the country should impact claims of Constitutional 
protection, relying in part on Boumediene to argue for a vision of 
membership and rights that accounts for community ties and participation 
in the political community, as opposed to technical grants of immigration 
status.164  
But the precise application of Boumediene and the Suspension Clause in 
the expedited removal context remains unresolved, with a pair of cases 
arising in the Third Circuit being the first courts to grapple with the 
question.165 The first case, Castro v. Department of Homeland Security, 
rejected the Suspension Clause challenge to expedited removal’s bar on 
                                                           
rights, and essentially maintains that functionalism has long been its standard methodology for deciding 
such questions.”). 
161. See Wilde, supra note 138, at 775 (“The ‘legal black hole’ designations [with respect to 
treatment of Guantanamo detainees] are, therefore, often invoked in relation to particular areas of law 
and have, to a certain extent, turned out to be unfounded given the 2004 decisions of the Supreme 
Court”). 
162. Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 961 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law after the 1996 
Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1963 (2000); Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in 
Immigration Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1668–79 (2000); Neuman, supra note 160; Jonathan Hafetz, 
The Untold Story of Noncriminal Habeas Corpus and the 1996 Immigration Acts, 107 YALE L.J. 2509 
(1998). 
163. Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 537, 567–77 (2010). See also Hafetz, supra note 162, at 2541 (suggesting expedited 
removal provisions preclusion of judicial review “could lead to the deportation of aliens based on 
erroneous factual findings” and that “[s]uch a result would flout the core purpose of the common law 
writ of habeas corpus”). 
164. D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented Immigrants and the 
Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 85 (2011) (relying in part on Boumediene to argue for a post-
territorial vision of Constitutional rights that “looks to more substantive indicators of membership, 
including community ties and mutuality of obligation, to afford rights”) [hereinafter Núñez, Inside the 
Border]. See also D. Carolina Núñez, Fractured Membership: Deconstructing Territoriality to Secure 
Rights and Remedies for the Undocumented Worker, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 817 (2010) (setting forth theory 
of post-territorial views of membership in political community). 
165. On March 8, 2018, a federal district court in California relied on Castro to deny the 
Suspension Clause claims of an asylum seeker seeking judicial review over the denial of his claims of 
credible fear. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 287 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 
8, 2018). The Ninth Circuit subsequently stayed the noncitizen’s removal pending further review.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
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judicial review. Issued in August 2016, Castro read 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) 
to bar habeas jurisdiction over twenty-eight women and children fleeing 
Central America, who claimed that they had been erroneously issued 
expedited removal orders despite having valid claims of credible fear.166 
Castro found that the Suspension Clause did not apply at all to the migrant 
women and children who had been processed through expedited removal.167 
The court emphasized the fact that the petitioners had been apprehended 
hours after entering the United States, and treated them as outside U.S. 
borders, despite their physical presence at a detention facility in 
Pennsylvania.168 In doing so, the Third Circuit relied on case law that 
reflects the plenary power doctrine in its strongest form. Castro assimilated 
the plaintiffs in the case to noncitizens physically located outside U.S. 
borders for purposes of granting constitutional rights, a reading that enabled 
the court to conclude that they lacked constitutional rights as a threshold 
matter.169  
Neither the plenary power doctrine nor the entry fiction doctrine is 
statically and consistently applied. Indeed, a longstanding discussion over 
the scope, continued vitality, and weakening of the plenary power doctrine 
is continuously percolating amongst immigration law scholars.170 But 
Castro invoked a strict version of each, grounded in two Supreme Court 
decisions from the Cold War era, both of which suggest heightened 
deference to Congress with few constitutional limits. The first case, United 
States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, famously asserted that “[w]hatever the 
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien 
denied entry is concerned.”171 The second, Shaughnessy v. United States ex 
rel. Mezei, affirmed Congress’s plenary power to determine the procedures 
afforded to noncitizens seeking entry and permitted the courts to view even 
individuals on U.S. soil, with prior ties to the United States, as akin to being 
                                                           
166. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 433–34 (3d Cir. 2016). For the most 
part, their asylum claims were based on domestic violence or gang-related violence. Id. at 427. 
167. Id. at 433–34. 
168. Id. at 445 (“Petitioners were each apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering the 
United States, so we think it appropriate to treat them as ‘alien[s] seeking initial admission to the United 
States.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
169. For a deeper discussion of the entry fiction doctrine, see generally Charles D. Weisselberg, 
The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei , 143 
U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995).  
170. The academic literature on the plenary power doctrine is extensive. See, e.g., id. at 1004-20 
(describing ambivalent public attitudes toward plenary power doctrine); Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1984) 
(tracing development of plenary power doctrine); David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power 
Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29, 30 (2015) (“It almost seems an obligatory rite of passage for 
scholars embarking on the study of immigration law to provide their own critique of plenary power or 
related doctrines of deference.”). 
171. 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).  
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at the border.172 Castro thus rejected the influence of more recent Supreme 
Court cases such as INS v. St. Cyr, which construed a federal immigration 
statute in light of the Suspension Clause to permit habeas review for LPRs 
facing deportation due to past criminal convictions.173 The Third Circuit 
also elided the holding of Boumediene by treating the petitioners as “alien[s] 
seeking initial admission to the United States, request[ing] a privilege” and 
thus having “no constitutional rights regarding [the] applications.”174 Of 
particular significance to the Castro court was the fact that the migrants 
were “each apprehended within hours of surreptitiously entering the United 
States.”175 It is worth noting that there are strong arguments that Castro was 
wrongly reasoned and decided, many of which are laid out in the 
Petitioner’s Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court but fall outside the 
scope of this Article.176 
 Castro explicitly recognized the possibility that constitutional rights 
“might apply in some future case where the alien ordered removed has been 
in the country for a period of time sufficient ‘to have become, in [some] real 
sense, a part of our population.’”177 And for good reason. For persons with 
stronger ties to the United States, the legacy of Mezei and Knauff are by no 
means etched in stone, particularly in light of cases like Landon v. 
Plasencia, where the Court recognized the due process rights of a LPR 
returning at the border.178 Similarly, the Court in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez recognized that constitutional protections apply to noncitizens 
“when they have come within the territory of the United States and 
developed substantial connections with this country.”179 
                                                           
172. 345 U.S. 206 (1953); see also Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 442–44 
(3d Cir. 2016). 
173. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300–08 (2001).  
174. 835 F.3d at 445.  
175. Id.  
176. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 
2016) (No. 16-812); see also Chloe Kim, Comment, Castro v. Department of Homeland Security: 
Keeping the Suspension Clause of Out Reach, CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE, http://www.californialawreview. 
org/keeping-the-suspension-clause-out-of-reach/ [https://perma.cc/E3L7-TD4H] (critiquing decision); 
Steve Vladeck, Third Circuit Holds Suspension Clause Does Not Apply to Non-Citizens Physically (But 
Not Lawfully) Present in the United States, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 29, 2016, 3:05 PM), https:// 
www.justsecurity.org/32597/circuit-holds-suspension-clause-apply-non-citizens-physically-but-law 
fully-present-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/T2A7-K4T8] (describing “breathtaking” decision that 
“seems simply nuts”).  
177. Castro, 835 F.3d at 448 n.29 (alteration in original) (quoting Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 
86, 100–01 (1903)); see also id. at 448 n.30 (“[W]e simply leave it to courts in the future to evaluate the 
Suspension Clause rights of an alien whose presence in the United States goes meaningfully beyond that 
of Petitioners here.”).  
178. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–34 (1982). See also Weisselberg, supra note 169, at 
989 (discussing tensions between Mezei/Knauff and Plasencia, and observing that “Plasencia directly 
conflicts with Mezei and Knauff”). 
179. 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990). For a helpful analysis of Verdugo-Urquidez, see Núñez, Inside the 
Border, supra note 164. 
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On June 18, 2018, the Third Circuit in Osorio-Martinez v. U.S. Attorney 
General began to answer the question of whether an immigrant’s ties to the 
United States might generate a Suspension Clause claim against the 
expedited removal provisions, and in doing limited the reach of Castro.180 
The petitioners in Osorio-Martinez were four children and their mothers 
who had unsuccessfully sought habeas review in Castro.181 Two years after 
Castro, the children had been granted Special Immigrant Juvenile Status 
(SIJS), an immigration classification for children who have been abused or 
neglected and otherwise meet certain eligibility requirements.182 Osorio-
Martinez affirmed Castro’s interpretation of the expedited removal statute 
as foreclosing habeas review for petitioners’ claims.183 But unlike Castro, 
Osorio-Martinez found that the Boumediene framework was applicable to 
the SIJS grantee children.184 The court emphasized the extensive federal 
statutory and regulatory framework associated with SIJS, which encourages 
the granting of lawful status to eligible youth.185 Drawing from case law 
recognizing the existence of constitutional rights for noncitizens with ties to 
the United States,186 the court asserted that the children were “much closer 
to lawful permanent residents than to aliens present in the United States for 
a few hours before their apprehension” to justify the application of the 
Suspension Clause.187 
In the wake of Castro and Osorio-Martinez, it remains unclear whether 
expedited removal’s judicial review restrictions will withstand 
constitutional scrutiny as applied to individuals who are not seeking entry 
at the border if they nonetheless lack an approved claim to formal lawful 
status. Osorio-Martinez stated in dicta that its holding does not “suggest that 
aliens must be accorded a formal statutory designation and attendant 
benefits to lay claim to ‘substantial connections’ to this country, or indeed, 
than an alien must have such connections to invoke the Suspension 
                                                           
180. 893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2018). 
181. Id. at 158. The children’s mothers were also Petitioners in Osorio-Martinez, but the court’s 
analysis related only to the children who had been granted SIJS, since “all the claims asserted pertain 
exclusively to the children.” Id. at 158 n.1.  
182. See 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J)(i) (defining a Special Immigrant Juvenile as a child “who has 
been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally 
committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or 
entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 
1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis 
found under State law”). 
183. See Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 164–66 (rejecting statutory arguments raised by 
petitioners). 
184. Id. at 166–67.  
185. Id. at 168–71.  
186. Id. at 168–69. 
187. Id. at 174. 
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Clause.”188 However, the court also did “not address [] what minimum 
requirements aliens must meet to lay claim to constitutional protections,” 
beyond its explicit holding that approval of SIJS was sufficient.189 Persons 
who are caught at the juncture of expedited removal and reinstatement raise 
particularly unresolved questions that may surface in the federal courts in 
the future. On one hand, individuals who are present in the U.S. following 
a prior removal may have meaningful ties to the country in the form of 
traditional positive equities such as family ties, long periods of residence, 
and community contributions. Osorio-Martinez noted that, while “not the 
basis for [the] decision,” the petitioners “have lived in the United States 
during this period and at least some of that time has been outside of 
detention in communities.”190 On the other hand, the courts could invoke 
the Supreme Court’s prior characterization of individuals subject to 
reinstatement as having engaged in a “continuing violation” of the law that 
justifies the application of a “new and less generous legal regime.”191 
The applicability of the Suspension Clause to the expedited removal 
provisions thus remains an open question, especially with respect to persons 
with a range of connections to the United States, and raises complex issues 
related to the relationships among territoriality, constitutional rights, and 
immigration status.  
B. Judicial Review of Reinstated Removal Orders and the Expedited 
Removal Exception 
Judicial review of reinstated removal orders alone is restricted, but not 
completely absent, and provides substantially more review compared to the 
expedited removal statute’s judicial review limitations. At minimum, the 
agency’s compliance with procedural requirements for a reinstatement order 
can be reviewed. Those procedural questions involve (1) whether the 
individual is a noncitizen, (2) whether the noncitizen was subject to a prior 
removal order, and (3) whether the noncitizen illegally re-entered the United 
States.192 Reinstated orders have been invalidated, for instance, where the 
agency has not established that the identity of the individual who received 
the predicate order is the same as the individual who received the reinstated 
order, or that the subsequent re-entry was unlawful.193 To be clear, the 
                                                           
188. Id. at 170 n.13 (internal citation omitted in original). 
189. Id. 
190. Id. at 175 n.20. 
191. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 44 (2006).  
192. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. 
193. See, e.g., Ponta-Garca v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 341, 343 (1st Cir. 2004); Rafaelano v. Wilson, 
471 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). For a further discussion of potential challenges to reinstatement 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
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agency action that courts can review is the decision to reinstate a prior order, 
as opposed to the underlying removal order itself. Although the government 
can implement a reinstated order at any time, any petition for review must 
be filed within a strict thirty-day deadline.194  
Reinstatement is like a house of cards: if the underlying removal order 
cannot stand due to a legal or other error, then the agency’s ability to 
reinstate similarly topples. But the law has made it difficult for individuals 
subject to reinstatement to question the validity of the underlying removal 
order. The prior removal order “is not subject to being reopened or 
reviewed”195 after or during the reinstatement proceeding.196 With respect 
to judicial review, the precise bounds of the federal courts’ jurisdiction to 
review predicate orders is less definitive. The mere availability of judicial 
review over reinstated orders does nothing to independently provide an 
avenue for review of the predicate order.197 However, a statutory provision 
unrelated to expedited removal orders, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), preserves 
review of “constitutional claims or questions of law raised” in the courts of 
appeals.198 Accordingly, courts have suggested that constitutional questions 
and questions of law raised by the underlying removal order may be 
reviewed.199 Some circuits have suggested that where a removal order 
serves as a predicate to reinstatement, judicial review of the predicate order 
                                                           
orders, see Dree K. Collopy, Crisis at the Border, Part III: Reinstatement of Removal and Demonstrating 
a Reasonable Fear of Persecution or Torture, 16-10 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (Oct. 2016). 
194. The thirty-day deadline can prevent courts from exercising jurisdiction to review defects in 
the underlying order, since typically the noncitizen will not have filed the petition for review within 
thirty days of entry of the predicate order. See Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1026 (2012); Sharashidze v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1177, 1178–79 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
195. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5). 
196. Although the statute does not appear to bar immigration judges from hearing motions to 
reopen a predicate removal order prior to the completion of a reinstated order, the courts have generally 
read the statute to mean that the right to reopen a removal order does not exist after the order has been 
reinstated. See, e.g., Zambrano Reyes v. Holder, 725 F.3d 744, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2013). But see Miller 
v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (permitting immigration judge to exercise jurisdiction over 
motion to reopen in absentia order, notwithstanding existence of reinstated order). 
197. See Cordova-Soto, 659 F.3d at 1030–31.  
198. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) states: “Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C) [precluding judicial 
review over denials of discretionary relief or against ‘criminal aliens’], or in any other provision of this 
chapter (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as 
precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed 
with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” 
199. Villegas de la Paz v. Holder, 614 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2010) (permitting review of legal 
and constitutional challenges to the prior immigration judge order); Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278, 
1281 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Because § 1231(a)(5)’s jurisdictional limitation is clearly outside the scope of 
§ 1252, we may no longer categorically hold that we lack jurisdiction to review constitutional and 
statutory claims related to all underlying removal orders.”); Ramirez-Molina v. Ziglar, 436 F.3d 508, 
513–14 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that § 1252(a)(2)(D) “prevents” the operation of § 1231(a)(5) in cases 
in which “an underlying order is questioned on constitutional or legal grounds”).  
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is available, at times requiring the showing of a “gross miscarriage of 
justice” in the initial removal proceeding.200 
But the result is different when the underlying order is an expedited 
removal order. Where reinstatement proceedings are premised on an 
expedited removal order, courts to have considered the question have found 
that judicial review—even habeas review—is not available due to the 
operation of the expedited removal-specific judicial review provisions.201 
Ironically, these individuals also received the least process at the outset. 
Nonetheless, even for a noncitizen with strong connections to the United 
States, the net result of the expedited removal statute combined with the 
reinstatement statute is a cocktail of jurisdictional bars that courts have read 
to deprive the federal courts of the ability to review for outright error, 
lawlessness, and constitutional violations. 
One of the most restrictive interpretations arose in the Ninth Circuit, in 
Garcia de Rincon v. DHS.202 Ms. Garcia de Rincon had meaningful ties to 
the United States, both before and after the entry of the expedited removal 
order, including a LPR husband and two U.S. citizen children.203 After 
marrying her spouse and having their first child in the United States, she 
traveled to Mexico to visit her sick mother. Upon her attempted return, she 
was apprehended by border officials and issued an expedited removal order. 
She then entered the United States without detection, had her second child, 
bought a home, and lived a peaceful life with no criminal record. After 
applying for her green card through her husband, she was taken by ICE and 
issued a reinstatement of the expedited removal order, which led her to file 
a habeas action.204 With respect to the expedited removal proceeding, Ms. 
Garcia de Rincon alleged due process violations based on the truncated 
procedures and her lack of understanding of the process.205 
Deciding the jurisdictional questions, Garcia de Rincon read the 
statutory provisions to mean that both the federal appeals court (in which 
she sought review of the predicate order) and the federal district court (in 
which she sought habeas review) lacked jurisdiction over the expedited 
removal order. Ms. Garcia de Rincon was thus left with no judicial forum 
                                                           
200. See Ramirez-Molina, 436 F.3d at 513–15; Debeato v. Att’y Gen., 505 F.3d 231, 234–35, 237 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
201. See Ochoa-Carrillo v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 781, 782 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he limited habeas 
review of removal orders issued under § 1225(b)(1) that is authorized by § 1252(e)(2) may not be 
conducted in a § 1231(a)(5) reinstatement proceeding.”); Lorenzo, 508 F.3d at 128; Debeato, 505 F.3d 
at 234–35. 
202. 539 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2008). 
203. Id. at 1135. 
204. Id. 1136. 
205. Id. at 1135 (alleging that noncitizen “did not understand many of the questions or what they 
were talking about . . . [she] was only 22 years old and [] was very frightened and confused . . . [and] 
did not know if they were even going to let [her] go.”). 
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in which to pursue her claims that the expedited removal order had violated 
her due process rights.206 With respect to appellate review, the court 
acknowledged that the circuit court retained jurisdiction over constitutional 
claims or questions of law related solely to the reinstated order, citing the 
statutory provision at 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D).207 But with respect to the 
“gross miscarriage of justice” basis for reviewing constitutional or legal 
questions in the underlying order recognized by some courts,208 Garcia de 
Rincon found that expedited removal was an exception. As the court stated, 
“whatever relief might be gained by the operation of § 1252(a)(2)(D) and 
the ‘gross miscarriage’ standard, it is unavailable to her because her 
underlying removal order is an expedited removal order that is subject to 
additional jurisdictional bars—8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(A) and 1252(e).”209  
Garcia de Rincon also read the habeas statute narrowly and found that 
the district court lacked jurisdiction to exercise habeas review over the 
expedited removal order.210 According to the court, the noncitizen did not 
raise one of the three “approved grounds” listed at 8 U.S.C. 1252(e)(2). The 
court rejected the argument that the statutory provisions violated the 
Suspension Clause, although it recognized that doing so would uphold a 
statute that “does not allow a habeas petition challenging an expedited 
removal order to be heard in any forum that could take evidence and thereby 
fully adjudicate the claim.”211 In reaching its conclusion that the mother of 
two U.S. citizens with no criminal record and over a decade of residence in 
the United States could not have her case heard in federal court, the Ninth 
Circuit recognized the “draconian,” “unsatisfying,” and “unduly harsh” 
result.212 But the case’s holding still stands, and other courts have followed 
suit.213 For instance, in a case also involving an individual who developed 
family ties to the United States after receiving an expedited removal order, 
the Tenth Circuit held that judicial review over the underlying expedited 
removal order was not available during a reinstatement proceeding—even 
for the constitutional issue of an alleged due process violation.214  
To be sure, the mere presence of an expedited removal order does not so 
taint a reinstatement proceeding that judicial review of errors made during 
reinstatement are impossible—although courts have considered the 
                                                           
206. The court also relied on its precedents to find that no Suspension Clause violation had 
occurred. Id. at 1141–42. 
207. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  
208. See supra note 200.  
209. Garcia de Rincon v. DHS, 539 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2008). 
210. Id. at 1140. 
211. Id. at 1141. 
212. Id. at 1142 (“When Congress enacted IIRIRA, it adopted a number of rules which fall with 
an implacable, and perhaps unintended, harshness on some aliens. So it is here.”). 
213. See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 287 F.Supp.3d 1077 (S.D. Cal. 2018). 
214. Lorenzo v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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possibility. In May 2017, the Ninth Circuit in Ayala v. Sessions clarified that 
even where a reinstated order is premised upon an expedited removal order, 
the very existence of an expedited removal order does not destroy the 
federal courts’ ability to exercise jurisdiction over the reasonable fear 
determination associated with a reinstatement. The court reviewed an IJ’s 
review of a negative reasonable fear finding (initially conducted by United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services), made during a reinstatement 
proceeding premised on an expedited removal order, and found that the IJ 
had erroneously applied the law.215 The panel independently raised, and 
rejected, the argument that Garcia de Rincon should deprive the court of 
jurisdiction over the reinstated order purely because the predicate order was 
an expedited removal.216 But the exercise of jurisdiction is modest. Ayala 
does not disturb either the unreviewability or the lasting impact associated 
with the expedited removal order.  
Thus, although reinstatement authorizes immigration authorities to 
invoke the existence of an expedited removal as grounds to place a person 
in the reinstatement process, the very basis for the reinstatement—the prior 
removal order—remains immune from any judicial scrutiny. In cases where 
an individual had an opportunity for a court hearing that resulted in a 
removal order, the theory behind barring review or reopening of the 
predicate order carries some logic: the noncitizen has had their proverbial 
day in court.217 This is not true with expedited removal. The end result of 
the reinstatement and expedited removal frameworks is that the legal 
sanction of expedited removal remains permanently in place, put into 
operation by the government’s ability to repeatedly reinstate the expedited 
removal order. A never-ending cycle of enforcement remains undisturbed 
by the federal courts, which read the statutes as depriving them of 
jurisdiction to review the triggering event—the predicate expedited removal 
order—that gives effect to the reinstatement. Those with the least amount 
of process at the front end also receive virtually no avenue to seek 
accountability by way of federal court review at the back end.  
 
                                                           
215. Ayala v. Sessions, 855 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2017). See also Martinez v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 
1155 (9th Cir.), amended and superseded by 873 F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 2017) (exercising jurisdiction over 
BIA’s dismissal of appeal seeking review of negative reasonable fear determination by immigration 
judge). 
216. Ayala, 855 F.3d at 1017–18. 
217. Of course, persons with prior removal orders hearings arising out of immigration court may 
not have had a fair day in court. See, e.g., Garcia-Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27, 43 (1st Cir. 2017) 
(Stahl, J., dissenting) (group immigration court hearing without interpreter in noncitizen’s native 
language); Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 488 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (in absentia 
order, where noncitizen claimed lack of notice); Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1026 (2012) (stipulated removal). 
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III. SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS: THE INADEQUACY OF CONVENTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO EXPEDITED REMOVAL AND REINSTATEMENT  
The Constitution does not apply in conventional ways to immigration 
law. Traditionally, the plenary power doctrine in its most robust form has 
suggested that Congress has unfettered, unrestricted authority to enact 
immigration statutes without intervention from the judicial branch. But the 
plenary power doctrine no longer exists in its strongest version only. The 
courts have carved out limitations within the plenary power doctrine and 
have often invoked statutory claims, constitutional avoidance, and 
procedural due process to curb governmental action in the immigration 
context. With expedited removal and reinstatement, however, the courts 
have invoked particularly robust iterations of the plenary power doctrine 
and adopted readings of the statutory scheme that permit the legal black 
holes to continue.  
A. Statutory Claims and Constitutional Avoidance 
The courts have many times elided the plenary power doctrine by 
resolving challenges to immigration agency action on statutory grounds. 
Whether on matters related to immigration detention,218 the immigration 
consequences of crime,219 or even the prominent court challenges to the 
Trump Administration’s travel ban,220 statutory arguments often seem 
favored by both advocates and the courts.221  
The constitutional avoidance canon, in which courts read statutes to 
avoid raising constitutional problems, is a particularly longstanding 
hallmark of statutory analysis in the immigration context.222 With respect to 
judicial review and the Suspension Clause, the Supreme Court in INS v. St. 
Cyr invoked constitutional avoidance to read a federal immigration statute 
that purported to strip LPRs of the right to judicial review as instead 
permitting habeas review in the federal district courts.223 As the Court 
explained, it would “expect a clear indication that Congress intended” a 
                                                           
218. See, e.g., Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory 
Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 146–47 (2015) (discussing 
statutory interpretation in immigration detention).  
219. See, e.g., Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical 
Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 264–65 
(2012) (discussing prominence of statutory analysis in case law on immigration consequences of 
criminal activity).  
220. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) (enjoining so-called “travel ban 
3.0” on statutory grounds), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. ___ (June 26, 2018). 
221. See generally Motomura, supra note 35.  
222. Id.  
223. 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
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result in which “a particular interpretation of a statute invokes the outer 
limits of Congress’ power.”224 Furthermore, given a statute with alternative 
interpretations, one of which would “raise serious constitutional problems,” 
and the other of which would not, the Court stated that it was “obligated to 
construe the statute to avoid such problems.”225 The St. Cyr Court stated that 
“some ‘judicial intervention in deportation cases’ is unquestionably 
‘required by the Constitution.’”226 Thus, the Court construed the statutory 
provision to permit habeas review without invalidating it.227 
But when it comes to expedited removal and reinstatement, statutory 
arguments have thus far not overwhelmingly persuaded the judiciary to 
intervene. The courts have adopted the government’s reading of the statute 
even while acknowledging the procedural shortcomings of the expedited 
removal scheme or the unfairness of the outcome in an individual case.228 
The courts have largely grounded their findings that judicial review of 
expedited removal orders does not exist in the explicit language of the 
statutes.229  
With respect to the narrower issue of habeas review, the courts have 
considered statutory arguments that, for instance, they should construe the 
statutory restriction of habeas relief to “whether the alien was ordered 
removed under [8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)]”230 to include review of whether the 
agency properly ordered the expedited removal order.231 Under this logic, 
the courts might exercise jurisdiction over expedited removal orders issued 
in error—for instance, because an officer failed to adequately inquire about 
or assess fear. The argument has gained traction in a handful of courts. In 
the Eastern District of Michigan, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee v. Ashcroft asserted habeas jurisdiction “to determine whether 
the expedited removal statute was lawfully applied . . . in the first place.”232 
Similarly, the District of Columbia exercised jurisdiction to address whether 
the noncitizen had been “ordered removed” where a supervisor failed to sign 
the removal order issued by a front-line officer.233 The court found that “a 
determination of whether a removal order ‘in fact was issued’ fairly 
                                                           
224. Id. at 299. 
225. Id. at 300.  
226. Id. (quoting Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953)). 
227. Id. at 314.  
228. See, e.g., Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325 (7th Cir. 2010).  
229. See, e.g., Li v. Eddy, 259 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) (“With respect to review of 
expedited removal orders, . . . the statute could not be much clearer in its intent to restrict habeas 
review.”).  
230. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2). 
231. See, e.g., Brumme v. INS, 275 F.3d 443, 447–48 (5th Cir. 2001); Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 430–31 (3d Cir. 2016). 
232. 272 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (emphasis in original).  
233. Dugdale v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 88 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2015).  
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encompasses a claim that the order was not lawfully issued due to some 
procedural defect.”234  
But a comparatively larger number of courts have rejected the statutory 
arguments, and emphasized the particular clarity of the expedited removal 
statutes.235 Indeed, the Third Circuit’s Castro decision acknowledged 
AADC v. Ashcroft but found the district court’s “construction of the statute 
to be not just unsupported, but also flatly contradicted by the plain language 
of the statute itself. . . .”236 Indeed, as discussed in Part III.A, the expedited 
removal provisions on judicial review have arguably been drafted with 
particular severity and left the courts unwilling to engage in alternative 
statutory readings.  
In the reinstatement context, statutory and regulatory challenges to 
reinstatement’s most procedurally deficient features—such as the absence 
of an immigration court hearing—have likewise not succeeded. 237 Although 
the reinstatement statute is silent with respect to the right to a hearing, the 
relevant regulations enable non-judicial officers to issue reinstatement 
orders.238 The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Morales-Izquierdo v. 
Gonzales upheld the validity of the regulations, and in doing so, emphasized 
Congress’s intent for reinstatement to operate as a “summary” and 
“ministerial” process that deprives noncitizens of the opportunity to seek 
relief.239 In a related vein, the courts have generally rejected statutory 
arguments that noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings should be 
eligible to seek asylum, and have emphasized the clarity—albeit 
harshness—of the reinstatement statute.240 
With respect to the constitutional avoidance canon, the courts have also 
been unreceptive when interpreting the jurisdictional bars. Indeed, 
constitutional avoidance has been an effective tool in many an immigration 
context, where courts have seized upon ambiguities in the statute to carve 
                                                           
234. Id. See also Smith v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 741 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2014) (leaving 
open question of whether Canadian noncitizen subject to expedited removal might have claims under 
Suspension Clause). 
235. Brumme, 275 F.3d. at 448.  
236. Castro, 835 F.3d at 432 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“[N]o court shall have 
jurisdiction to review . . . the application of [§ 1225(b)(1)] to individual aliens.”). See also Osorio-
Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 893 F.3d 153, 164–166 (3d Cir. 2018) (following Castro with respect to 
statutory claims). 
237. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); De Sandoval v. U.S. 
Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1276, 1283 (11th Cir. 2006); Ochoa-Carrillo v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 842, 846 (8th 
Cir. 2006); Lattab v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 20 (1st Cir. 2004).  
238. See 8 C.F.R.§ 241.8 (authorizing immigration officers to issue reinstatement orders without 
participation from immigration judges); cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).  
239. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 491. The Ninth Circuit found that Congress unambiguously 
expressed its desire to remove reinstatement proceedings from immigration court under step one of 
Chevron, but noted that other courts to date had decided the inquiry under step two of Chevron, finding 
that the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous statute was reasonable. Id. at 492–93. 
240. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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out avenues for back door relief for noncitizens.241 Not so with expedited 
removal. The Third Circuit’s decision in Castro, discussed above, illustrates 
this dynamic.242 The plaintiffs had urged the court to find the expedited 
removal statute ambiguous, and thus construe it to permit habeas review in 
order to avoid the Suspension Clause questions otherwise raised by denying 
them access to the federal courts.243 But the court asserted that the plaintiffs 
were “attempting to create ambiguity where none exists.”244  
In the reinstatement context, denying immigration court hearings to 
noncitizens arguably violates due process. Accordingly, the constitutional 
avoidance principle would require a reading of the statutory scheme to 
permit court hearings in order to avoid the constitutional question raised by 
the denial of hearings. But no court has yet adopted such a reading of the 
reinstatement statute. Morales-Izquierdo considered and rejected this 
argument, with the en banc court claiming that constitutional avoidance did 
not permit the court to construe an ambiguous statute where deference to 
the agency was otherwise warranted.245 In that case, however, a dissenting 
opinion by four judges from the Ninth Circuit emphatically argued in favor 
of applying constitutional avoidance to invalidate the regulation depriving 
noncitizens of immigration court hearings during the reinstatement process. 
The dissent argued that the regulation as written approaches a 
“constitutional danger zone” by failing to offer noncitizens with an 
opportunity to “challenge the legality of a prior removal order” or to 
“contest the predicates to reinstatement.”246 Constitutional avoidance thus 
might serve as a source of judicial intervention in the reinstatement 
landscape in the future, even if it has thus far proven unsuccessful.  
B. Procedural Due Process  
At first blush, procedural due process seems like a natural basis for 
concern with both expedited removal and reinstatement.247 After all, the 
                                                           
241. See supra Part III.A. 
242. Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016). 
243. Id. at 430–31.  
244. Id. at 431.  
245. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“When 
Congress has explicitly or implicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, and the agency has filled it, we have 
no authority to re-construe the statute, even to avoid potential constitutional problems; we can only 
decide whether the agency’s interpretation reflects a plausible reading of the statutory text. . . . [T]he 
constitutional avoidance doctrine . . . plays no role in the second Chevron inquiry.”). But see Immigration 
& Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Crowell v. 
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (“[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly possible,’ 
we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.”). 
246. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
247. See Gebisa, supra note 149, at 576–80.  
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hallmarks of both are procedurally truncated adjudications. And the specific 
interplay of expedited removal and reinstatement of removal creates a 
perfect storm in which the entry of one summary process (expedited 
removal) serves as a permanent justification for the imposition of another 
summary process (reinstatement). The circumstances surrounding these 
removal orders—back-room encounters with front-line officers—conspire 
to encourage procedural deficiencies.248  
Moreover, procedural due process is frequently invoked by the courts to 
extend rights protections to noncitizens in cases in which the plenary power 
doctrine might suggest unlimited governmental power otherwise.249 
Procedural due process often operates as a proxy for other constitutional 
rights not otherwise available to immigrants.250 If the plenary power 
doctrine states that constitutional rights do not apply to rules of admission 
or expulsion, then procedural due process is its antidote, stating that the 
procedures employed by the government to effect immigration policies 
must conform to the requirements of due process.251 But by the same token, 
the courts have often treated noncitizens as having diminished constitutional 
rights if they are seeking entry at the border.252 Under the entry fiction, they 
have applied the logic that noncitizens outside the border lack constitutional 
rights to find that even some immigrants physically present in the United 
States but legally—or rather, fictionally—still at the border also lack 
constitutional rights.253 
Procedural due process doctrine in the expedited removal context reveals 
a longstanding tension in immigration law over the application of the 
Constitution at and near the border. The relationship between physical 
presence only (which can exist without legal presence), and physical 
presence that compels the protections of due process, is complicated. The 
doctrine is not static or settled. At times, the Supreme Court has suggested 
that Congress has unrestricted authority to define what procedures apply at 
the border.254 At other times, it has suggested that a noncitizen’s preexisting 
ties to the United States give rise to due process rights that limit 
congressional dictates,255 and support for the position that procedural due 
                                                           
248. See supra text accompanying notes 96–107. 
249. Motomura, supra note 37, at 1656–59.  
250. Id. See also Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 493 (2011) (arguing that courts should continue to rely on procedural due process 
arguments under the Fifth Amendment). 
251. See Motomura, supra note 37, at 1628.  
252. See Weisselberg, supra note 169, at 951. 
253. Id.  
254. See supra text accompanying notes 171–172 (discussing holdings in Knauff and Mezei). 
255. See supra text accompanying note 178 (discussing Plasencia). 
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process rights belong to all noncitizens irrespective of status exists.256 Thus, 
for persons who lack lawful status and have been previously ordered 
removed—albeit under the expedited removal framework—due process is 
a messy, though not settled, fit. Indeed, strong arguments exist that due 
process applies once a person effects a physical entry into the United 
States.257 
At a more practical level, the statutory bars to judicial and habeas review 
discussed in Part II have prevented the courts from examining due process 
claims. For example, in a habeas petition filed in the District of New 
Mexico, a woman fleeing gangs in El Salvador with her ten-month-old baby 
were issued expedited removal orders.258 The procedural due process 
violations—which included failures to provide her with notice of the 
credible fear interview, failure to allow her to consult with her attorney, 
failure to provide child care during the interview, and application of the 
incorrect legal standard—were rejected based on those jurisdictional bars.259 
Even in a case involving the allegation that a noncitizen was “questioned 
for seven hours in the dead of night without any interpreter despite the 
agency’s own regulations calling for one,” the Seventh Circuit 
acknowledged that the bars on judicial and habeas review meant that “no 
court has the power to consider the legality of the agency’s actions.”260 The 
Third Circuit’s decision in Osorio-Martinez should give courts pause to 
more fully consider the due process implications of expedited removal, 
though.261 In finding that the Suspension Clause gave rise to a right to 
habeas review of expedited removal for children granted SIJS, the court 
noted that refusing their claims would “implicate constitutional due process 
concerns” by depriving the children of their ability to obtain statutory rights 
associated with SIJS.262  
 To the extent that procedural deficiencies infect an expedited removal 
that leads to reinstatement, judicial review over the reinstatement does not 
include jurisdiction over the expedited removal. Due process claims have 
been raised in litigation challenges of expedited removal orders, but courts 
                                                           
256. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (due process applies to all persons, 
even if their presence is “lawful, unlawful, temporary or permanent”); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 
77 (1976) (“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled 
to” due process). 
257. See, e.g., Brief of Scholars of Immigration Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 18-55313 (9th Cir. filed Apr. 4, 2018) (arguing that 
due process rights apply upon physical entry to the U.S.). I was a signatory to this amicus brief. The 
scope of the entry fiction doctrine, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.  
258. M.S.P.C. v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1156, 1158–59 (D.N.M. 2014). 
259. Id. at 1176. 
260. Khan v. Holder, 608 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 2010).  
261. See supra discussion accompanying notes 180–190. 
262. Osorio-Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 893 F.3d 153, 172 (3d Cir. 2018). 
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unable to exercise jurisdiction have not examined those claims or have 
viewed claimants’ due process rights with skepticism.263 The courts’ ability 
to even bear witness to the due process deficiencies during expedited 
removal is thus severely limited.  
With reinstatement, the courts have grappled minimally with the due 
process implications of layering one procedurally truncated process upon a 
procedurally flawed removal order in immigration proceedings.264 The 
Ninth Circuit in Morales-Izquierdo v. Holder found, for instance, that a 
reinstated removal order could not be invalidated even where the underlying 
order—an in absentia removal order allegedly issued without proper notice 
to the noncitizen265—may have violated due process.266 The court found that 
whatever procedural deficiencies in the underlying order may have existed 
did not, by extension, infect the reinstatement itself and that the noncitizen 
suffered no prejudice, since reinstatement does not require a procedurally 
sound prior order.267 Morales-Izquierdo asserted that reinstatement did not 
change the noncitizen’s access to legal rights or remedies, but emphasized 
that reinstatement simply prevented the “continuing violation” of the 
person’s ongoing presence in the United States following a removal 
order.268 In a more recent development, on May 8, 2018, the Ninth Circuit 
found that an IJ does have jurisdiction over a motion to reopen an in 
absentia order based on lack of notice, notwithstanding the existence of a 
reinstated order and thereby limiting the reach of Morales-Izquierdo.269 But 
in 2017, the First Circuit in Garcia-Garcia v. Sessions found no due process 
violation in the use of reinstatement where an indigenous Guatemalan 
immigrant fleeing extensive violence in his home country had been 
                                                           
263. See, e.g., Khan, 608 F.3d at 329 (“The Khans . . . were at the point of initial entry where their 
constitutional rights were at their lowest ebb.”); Garcia de Rincon v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 
F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Obaro, supra note 74, at 2163 (“In construing the expedited 
removal provisions, the courts have overwhelmingly embraced [a reading in which] noncitizens subject 
to expedited removal are seeking ‘admission,’ and are not actually on U.S. soil, [such that] they do not 
have any due process rights.”). 
264. Criminal prosecutions for illegal re-entry may present stronger opportunities to present due 
process claims than immigration cases. See, e.g., United States v. Ochoa-Oregel, No. 16-50413, *4-5 
(9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2018) (finding that procedural defects associated with in absentia removal order against 
former lawful permanent resident in turn “infect[ed]” subsequent expedited removal order); United 
States v. Arias-Ordonez, 596 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2010) (reinstatement based on procedurally 
defective removal cannot serve as basis for illegal re-entry prosecution). 
265. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (2015); Koh, supra note 10, at 219–222 (discussing procedural 
shortcomings associated with in absentia removal orders). 
266. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 495–96 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).  
267. Id. at 496.  
268. Id. at 497–98. The court asserted: “Reinstatement of a prior removal order—regardless of the 
process afforded in the underlying order—does not offend due process because reinstatement of a prior 
order does not change the alien’s rights or remedies. The only effect of the reinstatement order is to 
cause Morales’ removal, thus denying him any benefits from his latest violation of U.S. law, committed 
when he reentered the United States without the Attorney General’s permission . . . .” Id. 
269. Miller v. Sessions, 889 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2018).  
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previously removed in a procedurally questionable manner.270 There, the 
initial removal proceedings had been conducted by an IJ, but through a 
group hearing in which the noncitizen did not understand the proceedings 
because he did not speak Spanish, and only a Spanish interpreter was 
provided.271  
Despite these holdings, the courts have expressed noteworthy discomfort 
with the manner in which the reinstatement scheme presumes the validity 
of the prior order, triggering subsequent removal without providing a means 
to ensure the procedural regularity of the predicate order. In Garcia-Garcia, 
Judge Norman Stahl’s strongly worded dissent alleged that the majority 
“ignor[es] the fact that Garcia was denied due process in his initial removal 
proceedings,”272 and suggested that the “mechanical and categorical” 
application of the reinstatement provision might implicate the Suspension 
Clause’s prohibition on barring habeas review.273 Morales-Izquierdo also 
elicited a powerful dissent, authored by Judge Sidney Thomas and joined 
by Judges Pregerson, Reinhardt, and Fletcher.274 The Morales-Izquierdo 
dissent highlighted the “very serious due process concerns” raised by the 
reinstatement process.275 In particular, the dissent emphasized that 
reinstatement “does not provide any opportunity for the alien to challenge 
the legality of the prior removal order,”276 and the “regulatory procedure is 
so streamlined that it deprives reentering aliens of any meaningful 
opportunity to raise potentially viable legal, constitutional, or factual 
challenges to their removability.”277 Despite the powerfully-worded 
concerns articulated by a handful of dissenting opinions, the courts have not 
fully grappled with the implications of permitting reinstatement based on 
                                                           
270. Garcia-Garcia v. Sessions, 856 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2017). 
271. Id. at 43–46. The court explained: “We can surmise, as his counsel argued before the 
Immigration Judge in the 2015 proceedings, that Garcia had no idea what was going on at this en masse 
hearing at the border detention center. By the time the attorneys arrived in Texas to meet with Garcia 
and other similarly situated indigenous persons, it was too late, because he had already been ordered 
removed and waived his right to appeal.” Id. at 46. 
272. Id. at 43.  
273. Id. at 52. 
274. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 499 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
275. Id. at 505 (quoting Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1048 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on 
other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 36 n.5 (2006)); Aguilar-Garcia v. Ridge, 
90 F. App’x 220, 220 (9th Cir. 2004); Arreola-Arreola v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2004). 
The dissent went on to cite concerns expressed by other circuits about the “sufficiency of process” in 
reinstatement, citing United States v. Charleswell, 456 F.3d 347, 356 n.10 (3d Cir. 2006); Lattab v. 
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 8, 21 n.6 (1st Cir. 2004); Alvarez-Portillo v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 
2002), abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 36 & n.5: Gomez-Chavez v. 
Perryman, 308 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2002): Bejjani v. I.N.S., 271 F.3d 670, 687 (6th Cir. 2001), 
abrogated on other grounds by Fernandez-Vargas, 548 U.S. at 36 & n.5. 
276. Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 505.  
277. Id. at 507. 
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questionable prior removal orders, particularly during a political era in 
which the federal government is committed to an unquestionable agenda of 
mass deportation.  
The Ninth Circuit in Villa-Anguiano v. Holder placed a minor limitation 
on reinstatement’s use of procedurally defective removal orders, finding 
that reinstatement of removal was improper where a federal district court 
had entered a formal finding in a separate criminal proceeding that the 
underlying removal proceedings violated due process.278 But even Villa-
Anguiano did not reflect judicial consensus. Despite the limited holding of 
the case,279 Judge Tallman issued a strong dissent asserting that due process 
did not require the agency to engage in further procedures associated with 
reinstatement, even where the underlying removal order had been formally 
found to be legally defective.280 Judge Tallman’s dissent emphasized the 
minimal procedures required by the statutory and regulatory framework in 
place, as well as the concern (raised by Morales-Izquierdo) that noncitizens 
who unlawfully re-enter the United States should not be placed on more 
advantageous legal footing than those outside the country.281  
Due process challenges to reinstatements based on expedited removal 
thus remain difficult and contested, albeit potentially still viable. 
Establishing a due process remedy raises various challenges, including 
problems related to establishing the requisite levels of proof and prejudice 
as well as the enduring problem of federal court jurisdiction.282  
IV. A MODEST SOLUTION: ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW FOR 
REINSTATEMENT ORDERS BASED ON EXPEDITED REMOVAL  
This Part looks to a different source of law to limit the excesses of 
expedited removal and reinstatement. The Supreme Court in Judulang v. 
Holder clarified that “ordinary principles of administrative law” might lead 
to the invalidation of an immigration agency policy that fails to reflect 
reasoned decision-making.283 The case interpreted the existing A&C 
standard to include immigration policies that enable the discretionary 
charging decisions of front-line officers to unilaterally determine an 
individual’s eligibility for immigration relief, as well as policies that fail to 
                                                           
278. 727 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2013).  
279. Id. at 882. 
280. Id. (Tallman, J., dissenting). 
281. Id. at 884. 
282. See, e.g., Gomez-Velazco v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2018) (“As a general rule, 
an individual may obtain relief for a due process violation only if he shows that the violation caused him 
prejudice, meaning the violation potentially affected the outcome of the immigration proceeding.”). 
283. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 64 (2011). 
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demonstrate alignment with the overall purposes of the immigration laws.284 
This Part draws from the logic and reasoning of Judulang to suggest that 
the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) practice of routinely 
placing individuals in reinstatement proceedings based on the existence of 
a prior expedited removal order constitutes an arbitrary and capricious 
action.  
Subjecting only those cases involving reinstatements based on expedited 
removal to rigorous review is in many respects a limited solution that leaves 
harder questions unresolved, such as the independent operation of expedited 
removal and reinstatement, the scope of the Suspension Clause, and the 
thorny due process questions discussed earlier. But injecting A&C analysis 
into this tangled landscape presents benefits that have thus far gone 
unrealized by the courts. A&C review would enable the courts to confront 
agency power over summary removals at their zenith, and in an area where 
accountability has traditionally been nil in light of the jurisdictional bars to 
expedited removal. And A&C review allows the courts to focus more on the 
legitimacy of agency action, as opposed to the complex availability of rights 
and the nature of individual claims associated with due process.  
A. Immigration Policy Subject to Arbitrary and Capricious Review Under 
Judulang 
Arbitrary and capricious (A&C) review—also known as “hard look 
review”—originates in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which 
states that courts have authority to “hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action . . . [that is] arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
not in accordance with law . . . .”285 In two seminal cases, Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe286 and Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 287 the Supreme Court established that a 
critical component of A&C review is the requirement that any federal 
administrative agency action reflect reasoned decision-making. While the 
hard look doctrine is a prominent component of judicial review of agency 
action, courts and scholars have struggled to develop a unifying theory of 
A&C review.288 The courts have tended to apply A&C review differently 
                                                           
284. See discussion infra; see also Jeffrey D. Stein, Delineating Discretion: How Judulang Limits 
Executive Immigration Policy-Making Authority and Opens Channels for Future Challenges, 27 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 50–51 (2012).  
285. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  
286. 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
287. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
288. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Discretion, in A GUIDE TO 
JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES 177, 180 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 
2005) (noting the absence of “rules of thumb” for applying arbitrary and capricious review); Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of 
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depending on the context.289 A&C review in the immigration context has 
also surfaced more prominently in light of three federal district court rulings 
issued in the first half of 2018, finding that the Trump Administration’s 
revocation of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was an 
arbitrary and capricious agency action.290 Given the arguable fluidity in the 
hard look doctrine, and the uncertain future of arbitrary and capricious 
analysis in the DACA context, this Article focuses its discussion largely 
around the Court’s most exhaustive discussion of A&C review in the 
immigration context, Judulang v. Holder. 
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Judulang v. Holder resolved 
decades-long litigation over a policy adopted by the BIA (and advocated by 
DHS) known as the “comparable grounds rule,” which a unanimous Court 
found to constitute arbitrary and capricious agency action.291 Understanding 
the comparable grounds rule requires acknowledging that two sets of 
statutory grounds can authorize the government to initiate removal 
proceedings against an LPR.292 Which set of provisions apply depends on 
whether the individual is apprehended within the U.S. or at the border, 
seeking entry. When apprehended within the United States, the grounds of 
deportability at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 apply.293 If apprehended at the border, the 
grounds of inadmissibility (referred to as exclusion grounds prior to 
statutory changes in 1996) at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 apply.294 Longstanding 
precedent had established that certain LPRs could seek discretionary relief 
                                                           
Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1065–66 (1995) (“[T]he arbitrary and capricious standard 
is relatively open-ended, and the Supreme Court has not given it more precise content.”); R. George 
Wright, Arbitrariness: Why the Most Important Idea in Administrative Law Can’t be Defined, and What 
This Means for the Law in General, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 850–58 (2010) (discussing incoherence in 
arbitrary and capricious review under the APA). 
289. Louis J. Virelli, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 92 N.C. L. REV. 721, 728 
(2014) (“Since its adoption of hard look review, the Court has used relatively consistent language to 
describe its approach to reviewing agency policy decisions, but has in fact applied the concept of 
arbitrariness differently in a wide range of cases.”).  
290. The primary justification for all three orders focused on the concern that the decision to 
revoke DACA was based upon the assertion that the program was not lawful—an assertion that the 
courts found to be incorrect— therefore causing the rescission to constitute an arbitrary and capricious 
agency action under the APA. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 279 F. Supp. 
3d 1011, 1025–30 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Vidal v. Nielson, 291 F. Supp. 3d 260, 269–73 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); 
NAACP v. Trump, No. 17-1907, at *48 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2018). 
291. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 43 (2011); In re Blake, 23 I&N Dec. 722, 728 (BIA 2005); 
In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I&N Dec. 766, 772–773 (2005); see also Kate Aschenbrenner Rodriquez, 
Irreconcilable Similarities: The Inconsistent Analysis of 212(c) and 212(h) Waivers, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 
111 (2017).  
292. See also Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1813–16 (2013) 
(describing grounds of inadmissibility and deportability). 
293. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (“The term ‘removable’ means—(A) in the case of an alien not 
admitted to the United States, that the alien is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, or (B) in the 
case of an alien admitted to the United States, that the alien is deportable under section 1227 of this 
title.”). 
294. Id.  
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from removal, known as the 212(c) waiver, irrespective of whether the 
grounds of inadmissibility or deportability applied.295 But the comparable 
grounds rule limited the eligibility of certain LPRs facing grounds of 
deportability. When applied, the comparable grounds rule meant that lawful 
permanent residents apprehended in the U.S. interior would be eligible for 
212(c) relief only if the ground of deportability corresponded to a ground of 
inadmissibility. The comparable grounds rule was neither compelled, nor 
prohibited, by statute. As the Court put it, the comparable grounds rule arose 
out of “the broad discretion that the BIA currently exercises in deciding 
when two statutory grounds are comparable enough,”296 but the approach 
itself was “not an interpretation of any statutory language.”297  
It is tempting to view Judulang as a case primarily about 212(c) relief, 
an increasingly rare defense to deportation that was eliminated in the 1996 
immigration laws but preserved for those with pre-1996 convictions 
considered aggravated felonies through the Court’s prior decision in INS v. 
St. Cyr.298 But a closer examination of the case reveals that Judulang’s 
treatment of the APA’s A&C standard has potentially more far-reaching 
implications. As one commentator put it, Judulang “applied an independent 
[A&C] evaluation of the merits of an immigration agency’s policy, rather 
than just a review of the rationality of the process employed in developing 
that policy and a cursory check to ensure that the rule did not inexplicably 
depart from existing regulations or otherwise conflict with Congressional 
statutes.”299 Prior to the Court’s holding, it was not entirely clear whether 
the A&C standard applied directly in the immigration context.300 Indeed, 
none of the federal courts of appeals that had wrestled with the comparable 
grounds rule had invalidated it on A&C grounds,301 and arguments based on 
A&C review did not feature prominently in the parties’ briefing to the 
Court.302  
Yet Judulang referenced the generic A&C standard set forth in State 
Farm, which describes the oft-cited framework governing the requirement 
that agency action must reflect reasoned decision-making:  
                                                           
295. See Judulang, 565 U.S. at 45–50 (describing history associated with 212(c) relief and 
comparable grounds rule). 
296. Id. at 51 n.4.  
297. Id. at 52 n.7. 
298. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315–23 (2001) (holding that 212(c) relief is still available 
for those with pre-1996 aggravated felony convictions); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, 
Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011) (Justice Sotomayor asking, “Could I ask just a practical 
question? Does this issue go away finally when there are no more St. Cyr people?”). 
299. Stein, supra note 284, at 48.   
300. See id. at 40–45 (describing history of APA application in immigration context). 
301. See id. at 50.  
302. See Aschenbrenner, supra note 268, at 167-69 (discussing briefing in Judulang, which 
focused on agency deference and equal protection arguments over A&C arguments) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol96/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2018] WHEN SHADOW REMOVALS COLLIDE 385 
 
 
 
The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard is 
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant data and 
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a “rational 
connection between the facts found and the choice made.” In 
reviewing that explanation, we must “consider whether the decision 
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there 
has been a clear error of judgment.” Normally, an agency rule would 
be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which 
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider 
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its 
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so 
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the 
product of agency expertise.303 
The Judulang Court explained that the comparable grounds rule had 
“flunked that test”304—an indication that the comparable grounds rule was 
not a close case, but a clear abdication of the agency’s obligation to engage 
in reasoned decision-making.  
The Court built upon the basic State Farm standard to articulate a 
framework for analyzing arbitrary and capricious action in the deportation 
context specifically. The Court emphasized that “[b]y hinging a deportable 
alien’s eligibility for discretionary relief on the chance correspondence 
between statutory categories—a matter irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to 
reside in this country—the BIA has failed to exercise its discretion in a 
reasoned manner.”305 Building upon the well-established requirement that 
an agency rely on “relevant factors,” the Court emphasized that the agency’s 
approach “must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the immigration 
laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration system.”306 The Court 
acknowledged the “high stakes for an alien who has long resided in this 
country,” and insisted that deportation decisions not rest on “fortuitous and 
capricious” circumstances.307  
Despite referencing the existence of “factors that might be thought 
germane to the deportation decision,” which the comparable grounds rule 
fails to consider by “hing[ing] § 212(c) eligibility on an irrelevant 
comparison between statutory provisions,” Judulang does not articulate 
with specificity what those factors are. The Court does, however, suggest 
that eligibility for discretionary relief should correspond in some way to the 
                                                           
303. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citations omitted).  
304. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011). 
305. Id. at 58. 
306. Id.  
307. Id. at 55. 
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“worthiness” of the noncitizen,308 as well as to their “merit,”309 “attributes 
and circumstances,”310 and the question of whether they are “deserving.”311 
The Court also explains that agency practices must comport with “the goals 
of the deportation process or the rational operation of the immigration 
laws.”312 A reasonable reading of Judulang suggests that traditional 
equitable factors considered elsewhere in the immigration laws and in 
policy memos addressing prosecutorial discretion, such as length of 
residence, hardship, family ties, and other discretionary considerations 
might be relevant, or even required.313  
A second factor emphasized by the Court in finding that the comparable 
grounds rule fails under A&C review was that the rule empowers 
immigration officials’ initial charging decisions to carry legal consequences 
that are more pronounced than permitted by the requirement of reasoned 
decision-making.314 Initial charging decisions mattered in the 212(c) context 
because the removal ground charged by the immigration agency would 
determine the noncitizen’s eligibility for relief.315 As the Court pointed out, 
a noncitizen with a voluntary manslaughter conviction could be charged 
with the “crime involving moral turpitude” ground of inadmissibility, which 
would leave him eligible for discretionary relief.316 But he could also be 
charged for the same conviction with the crime of violence ground of 
deportability, which due to the absence of a statutory counterpart in the 
grounds of inadmissibility would render him ineligible for relief.317  
The Court explained its concern with the implications of front-line 
discretionary charges as follows:  
And underneath this layer of arbitrariness [the lack of consideration 
for the overall purpose of the immigration laws] lies yet another, 
                                                           
308. Id. The Court went on to ask, “Does an alien charged with a particular deportation ground 
become more worthy of relief because that ground happens to match up with another? Or less worthy of 
relief because the ground does not?” Id.  
309. Id. 
310. Id.  
311. Id. at 56. 
312. Id. at 58. 
313. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining the 
Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39, 53–55 (2013) 
(discussing possibility of arbitrary and capricious review for exercises of prosecutorial discretion in 
immigration that fail to consider certain types of equities); Jason Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: 
Deportation and Proportionality in the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1072 (2017) 
(observing that Judulang “evidences the Court’s clear discomfort with a deportation system that allows 
agency officials to exercise prosecutorial discretion without regard to the ‘alien’s fitness to remain in 
the country’”). 
314. Judulang, 565 U.S. at 53–54. 
315. Id. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. (emphasis added). 
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because the outcome of the Board’s comparable-grounds analysis 
itself may rest on the happenstance of an immigration official’s 
charging decision. . . . So everything hangs on the charge. And the 
Government has provided no reason to think that immigration 
officials must adhere to any set scheme in deciding what charges to 
bring, or that those officials are exercising their charging discretion 
with § 212(c) in mind. . . . So at base everything hangs on the fortuity 
of an individual official’s decision. An alien appearing before one 
official may suffer deportation; an identically situated alien 
appearing before another may gain the right to stay in this country.318 
The Court’s concern with the inflated impact of charging decisions has 
several dimensions. First, the Court emphasized the disproportionate effect 
of a charging decision, finding it problematic that “everything hangs on the 
charge.”319 Second, the Court expressed discomfort with the lack of 
guidance—the absence of “any set scheme”—for charging officials to make 
these high-stakes decisions.320 Third, the Court’s reference to the absence 
of any reason to believe that immigration “officials are exercising their 
charging discretion with § 212(c) in mind” demonstrates the Court’s 
mindfulness to the fact that charging officials likely do not deliberate 
meaningfully over the consequences of their decisions.321 Finally, the Court 
was troubled by the random and inconsistent nature of the charging 
decisions, which would impact identically-situated noncitizens differently. 
The Court quoted Judge Learned Hand, asserting that “deportation decisions 
cannot be made a ‘sport of chance.’”322 
In addition to framing the A&C analysis in the immigration context as 
requiring agency decisions to reflect the overall purposes of the immigration 
laws and refrain from locating excessive power in single charging decisions, 
Judulang’s treatment of the government’s rationale for the comparable 
grounds rule is noteworthy. The government had set forth three 
justifications for the BIA’s rule. First, the government argued that the 
comparable grounds rule was more faithful to the statutory language.323 The 
Court rejected the government’s reading of the statute, and emphasized the 
lack of statutory guidance in the INA on how 212(c) eligibility should be 
determined.324 Second, the government emphasized that the comparable 
                                                           
318. Id. at 57–58.  
319. Id. at 58. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. at 59 (quoting Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947). 
323. Id. 
324. Id. at 59–61. 
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grounds rule had been in use for decades.325 But the Court was clear that it 
found this argument unpersuasive, both in the case at hand and as a general 
principle of law. As the Court stated, “[a]rbitrary agency action becomes no 
less so by simple dint of repetition.”326 Indeed, the Court noted that the 
government’s changes in approach over the years suggested “mixed 
signals” with respect to the reasonableness of the policy.327 Finally, the 
government emphasized the efficiency and fiscal benefits of the policy. In 
rejecting this rationale, the Court noted that its holding “would force the 
Government to make additional individualized assessments of whether to 
actually grant relief.”328 The Court agreed that “[c]ost is an important factor 
for agencies to consider in many contexts.”329 But it went on to find cost an 
insufficient rationale to overcome the randomness of the policy: “cheapness 
alone cannot save an arbitrary agency policy. (If it could, flipping coins 
would be a valid way to determine an alien’s eligibility for a waiver.)”330  
B. Reviewing the Intersection of Expedited Removal and Reinstatement 
Under the Arbitrary and Capricious Standard 
The holding and logic of Judulang and prevailing A&C jurisprudence 
supports finding that the use of reinstatement, where the prior order is an 
expedited removal order, violates the requirement that administrative 
agencies demonstrate reasoned decision-making.331 A threshold question is 
whether judicial review is possible. Despite the tangle of jurisdictional bars 
discussed earlier, A&C review appears permissible under existing statutes. 
Reinstatement orders can be reviewed for questions of law.332 A&C review, 
as a component of the APA, is a question of law.333 Despite the extensive 
jurisdictional hurdles to direct review of expedited removal orders, the 
review discussed here questions the agency’s decision to invoke 
reinstatement based on the existence of an expedited removal order. Such 
                                                           
325. Id. at 61–63. 
326. Id. at 61. 
327. Id. at 62. 
328. Id. at 63. 
329. Id. at 63–64. 
330. Id. at 64. 
331. The reinstatement process as a whole raises a host of due process concerns that the courts 
have only begun to examine, particularly where the predicate orders were procedurally irregular. But the 
analysis in this Article is explicitly limited to instances where the agency uses reinstatement that is based 
on expedited removal order. Without discounting the potential for arbitrary and capricious review to 
apply to a broader class of reinstatement orders, the unique confluence of expedited removal and 
reinstatement raises arbitrariness concerns that necessitate a focused analysis. While relevant, 
reinstatement cases involving other types of removals fall outside the scope of this Article.  
332. See supra text accompanying notes 192–194. 
333. See, e.g., Sandoval v. Aetna Life and Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 380 (10th Cir. 1992); Sierra 
Club v. Salazar, 177 F. Supp. 3d 512, 527 (D.D.C. 2016). 
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review does not, however, call for direct review of the expedited removal 
order and appears not directly barred by the existing judicial review 
provisions. 
The essence of hard look review is the requirement that agency action 
reflect reasoned decision-making.334 DHS does not appear to have explained 
its decision to invoke reinstatement, or provide guidelines, even where an 
individual’s only prior removal order was an expedited removal order, 
thereby making it potentially more difficult to assess whether its use of 
expedited removal in this context is reasonable. In the late 1990s, a series 
of internal government memoranda encouraged ICE and CBP agents to use 
expedited removal, reinstatement, and stipulated orders of removal (in 
which detainees agree to the entry of an IJ-issued removal order) to the 
greatest extent possible.335 Indeed, reinstatements and expedited removal 
orders have remained in the shadows both in terms of practical 
implementation as well as higher-level policymaking and public disclosure. 
While ICE and CBP published data on the number of reinstatements and 
expedited removals,336 they have not disclosed information related to the 
types of removal orders serving as the basis of those reinstatements. Without 
an articulated rationale, what remains is the actual practice of invoking 
reinstatement based on an expedited removal order, a practice that can be 
examined under prevailing A&C standards. 
In several ways, the level of arbitrariness and the consequences resulting 
from agency policy are significantly more pronounced in the context of 
expedited removal and reinstatement relative to the comparable grounds 
rule at issue in Judulang. Judulang emphasized that the immigration 
agency’s policies must bear some relationship to the alien’s fitness to reside 
in the country.337 In Judulang, the comparable grounds rule led to certain 
immigrants being rendered ineligible to seek one form of discretionary relief 
from removal—the 212(c) waiver—due to the deportability ground 
applied.338 With expedited removal-based reinstatement, the mere fact that 
a person is placed in reinstatement makes the person entirely ineligible to 
seek almost any discretionary relief from removal before the immigration 
court.339  
                                                           
334. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). 
335. See Koh, supra note 13, at 505–507 (discussing internal agency memoranda directing 
expansion of summary removals). 
336. See supra note 15.  
337. See supra text accompanying notes 305–313. 
338. See supra text accompanying notes 294–300. 
339. Practically, it is highly likely that lawful permanent residents impacted by Judulang would 
not be eligible for immigration relief other than 212(c). Section 212(c) waivers were effectively 
eliminated by IIRIRA, but preserved for persons with pre-1996 aggravated felony convictions in INS v. 
St. Cyr. 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001). Under those same laws, noncitizens with aggravated felony 
convictions are barred from seeking most forms of relief from removal. See Koh, supra note 219, at 266. 
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With respect to the consequences associated with an individual officer’s 
charging decisions in which Judulang grounded a good part of its holding, 
the interplay of expedited removal and reinstatement also raises multiple 
levels of arbitrariness. In many cases, the only trait distinguishing a 
noncitizen subject to reinstatement due to an expedited removal order from 
a person who is undocumented, with no prior record and therefore subject 
to removal proceedings before an IJ, are the circumstances that took place 
upon an entry at the border. Two main charging decisions most deeply 
impact the outcome of an individual who was once apprehended at the 
border, and subsequently made the United States their home. The first is the 
decision made by a border patrol officer who apprehends an individual at 
the border during an encounter that might have taken place years or even 
decades in the past. That officer might have offered a voluntary return or 
issued an expedited removal order (in many cases, without adhering to the 
legal requirement that they screen the individual for possible fear of return). 
The second is the decision, years later upon apprehension in the interior, by 
an ICE officer who elects to either place a person in regular removal 
proceedings or put them in reinstatement. Both decisions might take less 
than two hours cumulatively, appear to lack meaningful internal guidelines 
to shape officers’ discretion, and are conducted by front-line officers who 
are generally not attorneys and who otherwise have minimal administrative 
or judicial oversight.340 
Compare the discretionary charging decisions that take place with 
expedited removal-based reinstatement to the charging decisions that the 
Court found problematic in Judulang. In Judulang, as with any immigration 
court proceeding, charging decisions were subject to scrutiny and review by 
several actors. Typically, the charging document known as the Notice to 
Appear is prepared by a front-line officer employed by ICE.341 Once filed 
with the immigration court, the case is assigned to an attorney from ICE’s 
Office of Chief Counsel, who must review and defend the allegations in 
immigration court.342 The IJ must enter a finding of removability, to ensure 
that the evidence (or admissions of the immigrant) support the legal ground 
of removability.343 The findings can be challenged administratively or in the 
federal court of appeals, and a written and oral record of proceedings 
sufficient for judicial review exists.344 Immigration court offers an 
extremely rudimentary legal process, and the absence of counsel for 
noncitizens and the structural under-resourcing means that oftentimes, 
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review of the charges is minimal.345 But immigration court still provides far 
more substantial procedural safeguards than expedited removal.  
Indeed, the particular inadequacy of the process surrounding the 
charging decisions made during expedited removal should weigh in favor 
of an A&C finding. A CBP officer who apprehends a noncitizen at the 
border might first decide how to process the individual, i.e., to offer either 
voluntary return or to place them in expedited removal proceedings.346 This 
decision depends on a number of factors typically unrelated to their “fitness 
to reside” in the United States.347 The date on which they were apprehended 
may be the most relevant factor, given that CBP has in more recent years 
directed officers to use expedited removal over voluntary return in the 
majority of cases.348 The geographic region in which the person was 
apprehended may also matter, since the agency has implemented expedited 
removal in different phases by geographic sector.349 Apart from factors such 
as time and geography, another variable appears to be the personality and 
disposition of the individual officer who conducted the proceedings. 
Unpredictable variables, such as whether the officer actually followed 
agency regulations and requirements with respect to assessing fear, and 
whether the transcript of proceedings accurately reflects the oral exchange 
that took place, would also appear to deeply impact the outcome.350 It may 
seem surprising to suggest that basic traits associated with fair 
proceedings—such as whether fundamental rules were followed or whether 
a conversation was accurately recorded— cannot be taken for granted. But 
expedited removal has developed and expanded over time without the kind 
of internal review and accountability normally required for fair procedures 
to exist. As discussed earlier, reports suggest a process rife with error and 
arbitrary action.351 Even so, the problem is not simply the failure to adhere 
to credible fear requirements. A broader problem lies with the failure of the 
expedited removal process itself to have considered individual equities 
otherwise valued by the immigration statutes and by the Supreme Court.  
To be sure, some administrative process surrounds expedited removal 
charging decisions, but the cursory review that exists is limited to discrete 
parts of the process. A noncitizen subject to expedited removal can request 
that an IJ review a negative credible fear decision.352 But to even get to the 
point where a person receives a credible fear interview still requires 
                                                           
345. See Koh, supra note 292, at 1855. 
346. See generally supra Part II.A.  
347. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 53 (2011). 
348. See supra discussion accompanying notes 79–80. 
349. See supra note 71. 
350. See supra discussion accompanying notes 95–100. 
351. See supra text accompanying notes 89–101.  
352. See supra text accompanying notes 84–88.  
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exercises of administrative judgment that frequently fall far into the 
shadows. During expedited removal, no assessment of an individual’s ties 
to the United States takes place. Furthermore, no clear mechanism for 
correction for CBP officers that fail to even ask about fear—in violation of 
the agency’s own regulations—exists.  
By the same token, the decision whether to seek reinstatement or place 
an individual in regular removal proceedings involves a level of discretion 
and arbitrariness that exceeds the process in Judulang. The decision to seek 
reinstatement typically is made either by a front-line ICE officer or by an 
ICE attorney. Even if a case is already in regular removal proceedings, an 
IJ cannot prevent an ICE attorney from relying on reinstatement to terminate 
the case.353 And as discussed earlier, the agency has no written guidelines 
that govern when it uses reinstatement, despite recommendations that it 
consider equitable factors in doing so.354  
A potential counterargument is that the use of reinstatement is authorized 
by statute. Even in Judulang, the Court addressed this argument by finding 
that the statute did not support the government’s reading.355 Here, the 
statutory arguments are more challenging and have been met with 
skepticism by the courts. However, the reinstatement statute nowhere 
specifies that expedited removal orders can serve as a basis for 
reinstatement.356 By contrast, in other provisions of the immigration statute, 
Congress did specifically reference expedited removal orders when it meant 
for them to serve as the basis for additional sanction.357 And the purpose of 
A&C review is arguably not to simply examine whether an agency practice 
is authorized by statute.  
Put differently, the mere fact that an agency’s organic statute permits a 
particular practice does not necessarily guarantee that it should clear the 
“hard look” threshold. The D.C. Circuit stated in a 2017 opinion that 
“[a]gency action may be consistent with the agency’s authorizing statute 
and yet arbitrary and capricious under the APA.”358 The court went on to 
                                                           
353. See, e.g., Platas-Hernandez v. Lynch, 611 F. App’x 404 (9th Cir. 2015) (refusing to exercise 
jurisdiction over case in which noncitizen sought cancellation of removal in immigration court, when 
ICE attorney moved to terminate case in order to place individual in reinstatement). The late Judge Harry 
Pregerson dissented, calling the case “yet another example of the cruelty and harshness of our 
immigration laws and the suffering inflicted on innocent family members and children.” Id. at 406 
(Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
354. See Wadhia, supra note 10. 
355. See supra text accompanying notes 326–327. 
356. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2016) (referencing “an order of removal”).  
357. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2016) (specifying that “any alien who has been ordered 
removed under [8 U.S.C. § 1125(b)(1) (2016), governing expedited removal] or at the end of proceedings 
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explain that “[t]he court’s inquiry on the latter point depends not solely on 
the agency’s legal authority, but instead on the agency’s ability to 
demonstrate that it engaged in reasoned decisionmaking,” and “the mere 
fact that a regulatory scheme is generally consistent with the agency’s 
authorizing statute does not shield each agency action taken under the 
scheme from arbitrary and capricious review.”359 Furthermore, Judulang 
acknowledged that the comparable grounds rule was not prohibited by 
statute.360 Although the government’s argument for statutory authorization 
seems stronger in the reinstatement-expedited removal context than with the 
comparable grounds rule, the statutory scheme should not preclude an 
arbitrary and capricious finding.  
Judulang discussed the Court’s own history of acknowledging “the high 
stakes for an alien who has long resided in this country”361 and its 
intervention in an “agency decision that would ‘make his right to remain 
here dependent on circumstances so fortuitous and capricious.’”362 A related 
strand of this argument emphasizes that the stakes are lower because 
persons subject to expedited removal-based reinstatement have diminished 
interests compared to lawful permanent residents seeking 212(c) waivers 
(who are long-time residents). But Judulang does not distinguish between 
lawful residents and undocumented immigrants. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Arizona v. United States affirms the central role of 
discretion in the immigration system, as well as the related idea that 
deportation need not be the inevitable result for many people who have 
violated the immigration laws.363 Indeed, one of the problems with the 
interplay of the expedited removal and reinstatement provisions is that a 
noncitizen never receives an opportunity to demonstrate their ties to the 
country or to attach legal recognition to those ties. Compelling arguments 
favor a reading that does not use immigration status or prior immigration 
violations as the only factor for determining the scope of rights that attach 
to noncitizens. Moreover, the immigration laws do, on balance, recognize 
that attachments to the country can matter, for instance with family 
petitions, waivers, or cancellation of removal applications. In fact, the 
                                                           
359. Id.  
360. Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 59–60 (2011). 
361. Id. at 58. 
362. Id. (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)). 
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DACA program (as implemented) and Deferred Action for Parental 
Accountability (DAPA) program (as proposed, but not implemented, by the 
Obama Administration) did not treat the existence of a prior removal as a 
necessary bar to relief, in a demonstration of the types of qualities—length 
of residence, nature of one’s criminal history—that would presumably 
reflect reasoned decision-making.364 But neither expedited removal nor 
reinstatement, and in particular their intersection, allow the law to see those 
ties.  
CONCLUSION 
Given the extraordinarily high numbers of expedited removal and 
reinstatement orders entered in the past decade, the interaction between the 
two is likewise ripe for growth—particularly in light of the Trump 
Administration’s policy agenda of mass deportation. The courts have over 
time enabled these shadow removals to flourish, and have read the statutory 
restrictions on judicial and habeas review of expedited removal orders to 
prevent them from providing accountability or restraint to the immigration 
agencies relying on summary removals.  
This Article has sought to both articulate the scope of the government’s 
power at the intersection of expedited removal and reinstatement, 
particularly but not exclusively its impact on persons with ties to the United 
States, and to suggest a different basis for judicial intervention via A&C 
review. A&C review is a limited solution to a deportation system that 
increasingly bypasses the immigration courts and deprives individuals of 
opportunities to seek relief. Ultimately, structural reforms at the statutory 
level are necessary, but unrealistic in the short term given the current 
composition of the federal government. Nonetheless, given the degree to 
which expedited removal and reinstatement currently operate, arbitrary and 
capricious arguments are worth pursuing until more systemic solutions can 
take place. 
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